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Abstract 
This paper examines the influence of Hannibal of Carthage on the art of war over time.  
Hannibal’s war with Rome provides a complex example of strategic and tactical successes and 
failures that have been modeled and studied throughout military history in one fashion or 
another.  The method of research was a literature review organized into chapters with relevant 
examples from ancient through modern history.  The primary finding was that Hannibal’s 
examples have been interpreted according to the needs of each observer.  There was no uniform 
conclusion of lessons drawn from Hannibal’s campaigns.  Perceptions were drawn by each 
author based on time and particular circumstances.  For instance, Machiavelli pillories 
Hannibal’s use of mercenaries as the antithesis of a virtuous society.  Alfred von Schlieffen 
studied the tactical battle of Cannae and attempted to construct a strategic level plan for war in 
Europe based on lessons drawn from his study.  Victor Hanson cites Hannibal’s war with Rome 
as a metaphor for the West’s current conflict with Islam, implying that the West will be 
ultimately victorious in this latest confrontation owing to the superiority of its institutions.  The 
main conclusion that can be drawn is that Hannibal’s successes and failures are still relevant for 
study by historians and practitioners of the military arts even though there is no one set of 
definitive lessons learned. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
“The Gauls were not conquered by the Roman legions but by Caesar.  It was not before 
the Carthaginian soldiers that Rome was made to tremble, but before Hannibal.” 
MajGen J.F.C. Fuller 
 
Perhaps no other commander in the history of warfare has exerted such a long-term 
influence on the minds and actions of warriors and scholars of the military arts.  It is almost 
impossible to read military history and not come across some reference to Hannibal and his 
exploits.1  His strategic genius enabled him to project a large army, almost undetected, from its 
marshalling area of Spain to the northern frontier of Rome via an improbable route.   
His tactical acumen allowed him to consistently outfight and outsmart his opponents in 
almost every encounter.  His skill in the application of strategy and innovative tactics allowed 
him to consistently unhinge his opponents and set battlefield conditions for his army’s success.  
His leadership ability allowed him to take a multicultural body of troops with disparate fighting 
abilities and forge them into an effective and virtually unbeatable instrument of war.  Hannibal’s 
accomplishments are only magnified when viewed in light of the larger, better-equipped, 
frequently better-trained, and more complex forces that he faced.2  For 16 years he marched and 
fought almost unchecked on the Italian Peninsula and established a reputation and record of 
achievement that is remarkable by any standard.   
Historian Adrian Goldsworthy describes the conflicts between Carthage and Rome as 
being fought on a scale seldom rivaled until modern times.3  Livy calls them the most significant 
confrontations in ancient history.4  Known as the Punic Wars, the two states fought three major 
wars in a period of just over 100 years.  The area of operations stretched from southern Europe 
across the Mediterranean to the North African coast and from the Iberian Peninsula eastward to 
Macedonia.  The conflict embroiled peoples of the entire region and caused the deaths of 
hundreds of thousands of combatants and civilians alike.  At the conclusion of the Third Punic 
War, Carthage lay in ashes and Rome stood unchallenged astride the Mediterranean.  Much of 
the warfighting character of the Romans was shaped and hardened during this conflict.  This 
character manifested itself through an unflinching tenacity, willingness to mobilize huge armies 
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time and again, and the strategic acumen to fight effectively in multiple widely separated 
theaters, and most importantly a belief that it was their destiny to rule the world.5  
As architect of the Carthaginian war effort in the Second Punic War, Hannibal brought 
Rome to the brink of strategic defeat.  His acts of leadership and warfighting skill nearly changed 
the course of history by preempting the rise of the Roman Empire in its early days.  Had 
Carthage prevailed, the course of Western Civilization would have been altered significantly. 6 
Although Hannibal ultimately lost his contest with Rome, and contributed directly to the 
downfall of Carthage, he achieved immortality in the minds of military men and students of the 
art of war.  In spite of his losing effort many have regarded him through the ages as the ultimate 
general.  As this paper will show, he has been studied and analyzed by a number of historians 
and strategists including Vegetius, Machiavelli, Napoleon, Schlieffen, and Eisenhower.  He is 
considered one of the “great captains” of history and is still studied and at times emulated by 
commanders and students of warfare. 
Perhaps the first example of “winning every battle but losing the war” Hannibal’s 
practice of the art continues to fascinate scholars, generals and laymen.  His knack for taking a 
heterogeneous mix of troops and welding them into a fighting machine that was without peer for 
many years stands as an example of excellent leadership and achievement.  His audacious 
actions in the tactical sense set the standard for the conduct of battles.  He has been labeled the 
“father of strategy” and today his exploits are still studied in light of how a successful general 
ought to conduct a campaign and might derive a strategy to ensure that strength is always placed 
opposite enemy weakness.7   
However, as this thesis will show, there are other interpretations of Hannibal’s legacy 
that are less flattering.  Machiavelli viewed him as a failure for several reasons in spite of his 
achievements.  Although there are aspects of his abilities that cannot be ignored for their positive 
lessons, there are also many negative lessons that military thinkers have drawn from Hannibal’s 
legacy.  
He has been faulted for embarking on a war that critics say he could not possibly win.  
He has been criticized for trying to implement a strategy that would never produce success.  He 
has been condemned for failing to turn an unbroken string of tactical victories into strategic 
success.8  Although he turned the disparate elements of his army into an excellent fighting 
instrument, he (and Carthage) has been criticized for fighting wars relying almost exclusively on 
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mercenary armies that would never have a stake in the outcome like citizen soldiers.  In another 
vein of criticism A.T. Mahan takes him to task for failing to recognize the importance of sea 
power to the prosecution of a land campaign. 
A survey of references to Hannibal yields the conclusion that interpretations of 
Hannibal’s legacy are not uniform.  Interpretation varies across time and circumstance.  Each 
critic seeks to draw relevant lessons applicable to his own circumstances and context.  For 
example, Machiavelli thoroughly criticizes Hannibal’s use of mercenaries to constitute his army 
rather than using loyal citizen troops; Schlieffen studies Hannibal’s tactical success at Cannae as 
a means to discover how to remedy his own strategic concerns in advance of the First World 
War.  Victor Hanson criticizes the culture and institutions of Carthage in his discussion of their 
ability to defeat Rome, linking the current struggle between Islamic culture and the West with 
that of Rome and Carthage.  This paper will show the differing interpretations of Hannibal’s 
legacy over time based on observer and context. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Background 
No discussion of Hannibal’s legacy is complete without some background on the origins 
and conclusion of the Punic Wars.  These wars spanned over a hundred years, caused hundreds 
of thousands of casualties on both sides and resulted in the ultimate destruction of Carthage.    
Hannibal’s successes during the Second Punic War engendered such fear and resentment in the 
Romans that they dreaded the rise of another military leader as capable as he.  As a foundation 
for this analysis we will look at a short background of the Punic Wars in general and a more 
detailed examination of the Second Punic War in particular.  This information will provide an 
understanding of Hannibal’s achievements in tactical operations and demonstrate the shattering 
successes which have been emulated over time and are still studied today.  We will also see 
examples of Hannibal’s strategic acumen, and provide examples where his skills in this area 
have been criticized.    
First Punic War  
The clashes began in 264 BC as a confrontation between a long-established maritime 
power and a budding land power in the First Punic War and lasted for 23 years.  It saw 
significant fighting on Sicily and some fairly large land battles on the African mainland.  There 
were also several important naval battles, which directly challenged the naval supremacy of 
Carthage.  Already a formidable foe on land, Rome became a significant threat at sea.9    
Through several initiatives including development of the corvus (a moveable wooden 
bridge with a large spike on the bottom that was used to grapple Carthaginian ships for 
boarding), and recruiting of non-Roman sailors and shipwrights to establish a viable navy Rome 
shaped conditions to bring her main source of military power (infantry) to bear against 
Carthaginian sea power with decisive results.  Once a Roman ship was maneuvered close enough 
to the enemy vessel, the Corvus was allowed to drop and pierce the deck of the enemy ship.  It 
became nearly impossible for the ship to escape, and Roman marines were then used to board the 
enemy ship and complete its capture or destruction.   
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Carthage was unable to turn a clear-cut advantage in individual seamanship and skill into 
consistent military success.  The superiority of the individual Carthaginian sailor did not 
guarantee the superiority of Carthaginian fleets against their Roman counterparts.  Except for 
some successes at sea, Carthage went from being virtually unchallenged as a naval power to 
being frequently defeated by a state that previously had no navy and no naval experience.  It is a 
credit to the adaptability of the Romans that they were able to learn from a worthy opponent the 
necessary skills to build and maintain fleets, and train the sailors and marines that were then able 
to unseat Carthage from its position as master of the sea.10 
Hannibal’s father, Hamilcar Barca was the one bright spot for Carthage during that 
conflict, and although he achieved no significant victories, he had at least been able to avoid 
defeat during his campaigning in Sicily.11  The end result of over two decades of fighting was 
disastrous for Carthage.  Her military power had been severely eroded and her unchallenged 
mastery of the seas was gone.  The government and people were weary from a war that would 
not end against a foe who would not quit.  Carthage ended up saddled with a huge indemnity, 
losing the bulk of her island possessions in the Mediterranean, and perhaps worst of all, was no 
longer the leading sea power.  In short, the first war with Rome ended terribly for Carthage and 
contained the seeds of future confrontation with the Romans.12 
Perhaps the only thing that saved Carthage from complete destruction at that point was 
the fact that the Romans were weary of the war as well.13  After years of fighting and a series of 
stalemates the Romans had finally achieved a decisive victory at sea.  Rome’s newly found 
hegemony of the sea-lanes ensured that she could maintain the initiative by landing wherever and 
whenever she chose.  This superiority also severely compromised Carthaginian sea-trade, which 
was the historical basis of her wealth.  Carthage, which had traditionally exercised relatively 
unchallenged leadership in the Mediterranean Basin, was forced to acknowledge the primacy of 
Rome.  Carthaginian sea power was broken and never recovered.  This was a shattering loss that 
continued to plague Carthage throughout its conflict with Rome.   
If the maritime situation were not bad enough, the government of Carthage also faced a 
mutiny in its mercenary army, which in 241 B.C.E. was marching on the city of Carthage itself.  
The mutiny was the result of the government’s failure to pay its soldiers for an extended period 
of time during the war.  As there was no victory, there were no spoils and the desperate situation 
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was only magnified.  Faced with a crushing debt to pay, mutinous soldiers, a depleted treasury, 
and severely compromised ability to trade at sea – the situation in Carthage was dire. 
The changed strategic landscape necessitated a change in Carthaginian strategy.  If 
Carthage were to maintain its power as a state, and maintain a dominant position in the 
Mediterranean, it would have to come up with additional sources of revenue and manpower 
resources that could be forged into instruments of state power.  Because of Rome’s newfound 
dominance at sea, Carthage was forced to look west to the Iberian Peninsula.   
Second Punic War  
Spain contained in large quantities all manner of resources necessary for the prosecution 
of war.  There was a significant amount of arable land, much mineral wealth (silver and gold), 
and robust populations of warlike peoples living there.  Once brought under the sway of 
Carthage, this area would be a strong foundation upon which to build and maintain an army as 
well as refresh the coffers of Carthage.  An added benefit was the fact that this “sphere of 
influence” was far away from the prying eyes of Rome. 
Although Carthage had long traded with various tribes in Spain, Hannibal’s father 
determined to expand Carthaginian influence.  Phoenician and Greek settlements had existed for 
centuries on the Iberian Peninsula, and it is apparent that Hamilcar and the government of 
Carthage recognized the region for the immense source of wealth it was.  The Carthaginian 
presence grew from a few widely separated trading posts into a full-fledged colony.  
Hamilcar set about conquering a large portion of Spain in the name of Carthage.  
Polybius writes “The success of the Carthaginian enterprise in Spain must be regarded as the 
third cause of the war, for it was the assurance which they drew from this increase in their 
strength which enabled them to embark on the war with confidence.”14  (According to Polybius 
the other two reasons were Hamilcar’s anger over the outcome of the First Punic War, and 
Rome’s subsequent annexation of Sardinia and demand for additional money to avoid making 
war on Carthage once again.)  There is some speculation that Hamilcar’s actions were driven by 
greed and the desire to enrich his own household.  However it seems safe to say that given the 
strategic setting, the primary goal was certainly to rebuild the power of Carthage relative to that 
of Rome, especially in light of the results of the First Punic War.  Hamilcar was quite successful 
and succeeded in a relatively short period of time to reducing the tribes of southern Spain to 
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vassal status.15  Hamilcar’s campaign was cut short by his death in 227 B.C.E.  He was 
succeeded by his son-in-law (Hasdrubal), who managed affairs for nearly six years until his 
betrayal and murder.  He was in turn succeeded by Hannibal in 221 B.C.E. 
During his service in Spain under his father and then his uncle, Hannibal’s mettle was 
developed.  He became a skilled warrior, a brilliant commander, and developed the leadership 
skills dealing with disparate peoples that would stand him in such good stead for the duration of 
the Second Punic War.  
Hannibal’s war was thus a continuation of a longstanding and growing conflict between 
Rome and Carthage that had begun in the third century B.C.E.  Although there were extended 
periods without open warfare between the two states, a close reading of the history reveals that 
conflict was never far from the surface.  As a seafaring, trading empire, Carthage was the 
regional powerhouse long before Rome entered the scene.  That Rome was initially a land-based 
power only delayed the conflict between the states.  With the rise of Rome and the gradual 
subjugation and absorption of the tribes in Italy, conflict with Carthage was inevitable.   
No other general came as close as Hannibal to destroying Rome.  During his 16-year 
sojourn on the Italian Peninsula, he would repeatedly defeat Roman armies sent to fight him.  He 
would outwit and outfight almost every general sent against him in Italy.  His polyglot army 
consisted of professionals, mostly mercenary, from every province under Carthaginian rule or 
sway.  Hannibal displayed an exceptional talent for molding this mixed group of troops into a 
highly capable and effective fighting force. 
Although Rome’s legions were never short of courage and willingness to fight, Hannibal 
regularly outfoxed them.  Rare was the occasion when Hannibal was caught in a position of 
disadvantage.  He was consistently able to set the conditions in order to fight with the advantage.  
One of his principal traits was the ability to understand opposing commanders and tailor his 
tactics to take advantage of them.  He was a master in the use of terrain and stratagem to gain an 
advantage.  His ability to always remain a step or two ahead of his opponents ensured that they 
were always reacting to his initiative instead of the opposite.  Polybius writes, “Everything that 
befell both peoples, the Roman and the Carthaginian, originated from one effective cause – one 
man and one mind – by which I mean Hannibal.”16 
Hannibal’s campaigns included some of the most costly, in terms of Roman casualties, in 
Roman history.  In the early years of the war, he inflicted several staggering defeats on the 
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Romans by taking advantage of their aggressiveness and lack of appreciation of the usefulness of 
deception.  Roman soldiers invariably gave a good account of themselves in any fight, but 
Hannibal always managed to pit his strengths against Roman weakness.17  These actions took 
various forms, including pitting Carthaginian cavalry against its weaker Roman counterpart, or 
by taking advantage of deception and surprise to gain the upper hand.  Roman writers referring 
to the perfidy of the Carthaginians frequently had in mind Hannibal’s ability to manipulate and 
deceive.  During the first several years of the war, Hannibal and his army seemed unbeatable. 
Hannibal’s Signature Victory  
Traditional discussions of Hannibal are bound to cover the “Alps and elephants,” as a 
result of the maneuver that is rightly lauded as a model of strategic thinking.  However, 
maneuvering is not all that wins battles, and although Hannibal did achieve a measure of 
strategic surprise, the Romans were not completely caught off guard.  Roman armies only missed 
interdicting Hannibal by a day or so prior to his ascent of the Alps.  Although this achievement 
cannot be minimized, his real brilliance was shown time and again at the tactical level in his 
conduct of warfighting.  If brilliant maneuvering is necessary to the most successful outcomes, 
much still remains to be done when the maneuvering phase is over.  The details are in the 
execution and history is littered with examples of generals who failed to combine maneuver with 
successful tactical execution. 
Hannibal’s place in history was cemented by his success at Cannae.  Of all his 
achievements throughout years of campaigning, Cannae was the most significant defeat that 
Hannibal administered to the armies of Rome.  In fact it has been described as one of the most 
significant defeats of any Western army in the history of warfare.18  As long as Rome existed 
Cannae was remembered as one of the darkest days in its history.   
The battle came less than two years into the war on the heels of several other decisive 
victories against Roman armies.  Following the Roman defeats at the Ticinus, the Trebbia, and 
Lake Trasimene, the Romans according to Polybius were very nearly in a panic and in no shape 
to give battle.19  Their vaunted legions and reputation for invincibility in battle was seriously in 
doubt.  Their available resources were stretched to the breaking point and their plans for the 
conduct of the war had been completely upset.   
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Not only was there no chance to make this a short war and carry it into the back yard of 
the enemy, but the reality was that Rome seemed to be in a fight for its very existence.  Several 
Roman allies surrendered to the Carthaginians while others questioned their support of the 
Romans and even refused to send additional troops to support the war effort.  Polybius writes, 
“As for the Romans, after this defeat they gave up all hope of maintaining their supremacy over 
the Italians, and began to fear for their native soil, and indeed for their very existence, since they 
expected Hannibal to appear at any moment.”20   
According to the evidence available, Hannibal’s probable strategic goal was to fragment 
Rome’s alliances with the Latin city-states.  Apparently he had no intention of destroying Rome 
as a state.21  After the battle of Cannae in his attempt to ransom Roman captives, Livy writes that 
Hannibal had the captives brought before him and told them that “He was not engaged in a war 
to the death with Rome; he was fighting for honor and empire.”22  He had every notion of 
avenging the Carthaginian defeat in the first Punic War and intended to ensure that Carthaginian 
status in the Mediterranean was restored to the position of preeminence.  It seems his approach 
was to separate the Romans from their allies and then whittle away their state power.  He 
seemingly intended that they might survive, but in a much reduced condition, and without the 
means or the desire to interfere with the affairs of Carthage.   
It seems apparent that Hannibal fully expected the Romans to behave according to the 
rules of warfare that existed at the time – at least as Hannibal understood them.  The rules were 
those of the Hellenistic world and based on the assumption that if one administered a series of 
crushing defeats to the opponent, then the opponent would modify his behavior, do the sensible 
thing, and seek a solution at the peace table.23  According to Livy, he was not intent on the 
destruction of Rome.24  Hannibal expected that the Romans would adhere to their own standards 
in the conduct of war.  Polybius writes, “In the past the Romans had made war upon all peoples, 
but only to the point at which their opponents had been defeated and had acknowledged that they 
would obey them and execute their commands.”25 
Hannibal’s actions, including the offer to ransom prisoners, and his attempts to fracture 
alliances indicates that he may have expected his Roman opponents to realize the error of their 
ways and accept defeat.  This proved to be one of the key elements of miscalculation on his part.  
He completely misjudged how the Romans would react in the face of extreme adversity.  What 
he understood as the accepted standard of conduct among nations did not seem to apply here.  
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Even after the significant defeats and slaughter of thousands of men at the hands of the 
Carthaginians the Romans would not submit.  Although several of the leading cities in southern 
Italy went over to the Carthaginians, the Romans would not yield.  And even with thousands of 
their soldiers on the line as potential bargaining chips, the Romans still refused to treat with 
Hannibal.26   
It is also apparent that the government of Carthage miscalculated how long the war with 
the Romans would last.  Although the sources are not as clear as we would like, it is apparent 
that the Carthaginians expected the war to last but a short while.  They did not exhibit the long 
term thinking and vision required for a long term campaign against a tenacious foe.  Although 
the government apparently all but placed the war in the hands of the Barca family, it did very 
little in the way of contributing to long term victory.  There were several occasions when a 
concerted effort by the government to provide assistance to Hannibal might have tipped the war 
effort irrevocably in their favor.  That help was never forthcoming.   
What reinforcements Hannibal did receive he arranged for on his own.  Although the 
government did not dabble much in the affairs of the war in Italy, it was extremely interested in 
ensuring the retention of Spain and the wealth it was generating for Carthage.  It appears that the 
struggle to defeat the Romans being waged on the Italian peninsula and elsewhere was left to 
Hannibal.27       
Although the battle of Cannae itself is fascinating, many of the events leading up to it are 
equally worthy of mention.  The Romans had found a general who was successful in his own 
right at keeping Hannibal’s armies at bay, and if not able to defeat Hannibal, was himself at least 
able to avoid being defeated by him.  This represented no small achievement given the 
resounding victories that Hannibal had attained versus the generals previously sent against him.  
The Roman general was Fabius Maximus and for the Roman strategist Frontinus and historian 
Vegetius he represented acumen and skill.  Unlike those before him, he alone had been able to 
preserve his army and in some measure keep Hannibal in check.  In spite of his abilities, the 
Romans associated his tactics with stalling, dithering, and general indecisiveness.  He lost his 
position over the very caution that had allowed him to keep his army intact in the field against 
Hannibal.   
The Roman Senate replaced Fabius with Terentius Varro and Aemelius Paulus.  Of the 
two, Varro was considered more lacking in the positive attributes of Fabius, and considered not 
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of the same caliber.  Whatever his faults, he was at least aggressive in the proper Roman 
tradition.  Per the Roman custom of the time, command of the army was changed on alternate 
days between the two pro-consuls.  Knowing that Varro was more aggressive than his fellow 
pro-consul, to the point of being impetuous, Hannibal hoped to take advantage of that personality 
trait.  Livy tells us that: 
Hannibal had as full and accurate knowledge of the state of things in the Roman 
army as he had of his own.  He was well aware that the command was in the 
hands of two dissimilar men, who would never agree, and that almost two thirds 
of the Roman force was raw recruits.  He was confident that the time was ripe, 
and the means at hand, to catch them in a trap.28 
Having offered to fight and having been refused by Paulus, Hannibal appears to have 
finally timed his display to goad the Romans in to battle on a day that Varro was to be in 
command.  The frustration of the previous day’s refusal of combat apparently weighed heavily 
on Varro and his commanders.  Varro was confident in his abilities to defeat the Carthaginians.29  
He believed the terrain was in his favor.  He had a decisive advantage in the main Roman 
strength of heavy infantry.  His right flank was anchored on a natural obstacle and he had 
sufficient infantry to weather any Carthaginian attempt to turn his left flank.  According to 
Caven, Varro also appears to have believed that with his advantage in infantry he could punch a 
hole in the Carthaginian center and defeat the divided forces in detail.30  At this point in history, 
this was the largest army that Rome had ever put into the field in one place and confidence was 
running high.31 
Hannibal laid the trap perfectly and an obliging Varro took the bait all too readily.  
Hannibal arrayed his forces in a manner that placed his most aggressive troops opposite the 
Roman center and in a position well forward of his own line.  This disposition achieved two 
things; the first being that the bulk of those troops were Gauls and Spaniards whose presence was 
calculated to enrage the Romans and goad them into pressing forward.  The Romans regarded 
these forces as barbarian, traitorous, and a conquered people.  Their readiness to fight the 
Romans on the Romans’ own turf was sure to incite the Romans to attack all the more readily.   
Hannibal was also able to take advantage of Varro’s disposition of troops.  Varro 
intended to punch a hole through the weaker Carthaginian infantry.    This resulted in Varro 
deploying the center of his line of troops in an unfamiliar and uncharacteristically deep 
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formation.  This ensured that for all practical purposes, Varro’s large advantage of heavy infantry 
was effectively nullified owing to the fact that based on the size of the battlefield only some 
2000 Roman infantry could be brought to bear against the Carthaginian line at one time.  This 
deployment gave Hannibal the parity in heavy infantry he would need to spring the trap he was 
setting for Varro. 
Hannibal arrayed his numerically superior cavalry on the flanks, which is where he 
intended to deliver the decisive blow against his enemies.  He was always able to count on the 
superiority of his cavalry, and like Alexander before him the cavalry was the main striking force 
and normally delivered the knockout blow in his battles. 
Another aspect of Hannibal’s deployment required that he post his best heavy infantry on 
the wings of his formation.  This too was risky, for it split his best infantry and ensured that it 
would be defeated in detail if his plan failed to materialize as envisioned.  If however he was 
able to bring events about in a manner of his choosing then this posting would allow him to pin 
the Romans in a vice and attack them from all sides and completely nullify the overwhelming 
Roman superiority in numbers. 
The final aspect of Hannibal’s concept, which requires mentioning, is that of the 
requirement for absolute synchronization of the plan.  Without it, his thin center might be 
defeated before his cavalry could win on the wings and deliver the decisive blow.  If the cavalry 
did not win decisively on the flanks in a rapid manner, the plan would come to naught.  And 
finally if the cavalry was successful, those troops must exhibit the highest standards of discipline 
by returning to the main fight and not joining in the pursuit of defeated Roman cavalry or 
destruction of his camp as cavalry of the day, and particularly mercenary cavalry were want to 
do.  There was also significant risk to his widely separated blocks of Libyan infantry.  Although 
generally equal to Roman infantry in an even fight, they were deployed in such a manner as to 
ensure their defeat if the plan failed to work.32 
In the end, Hannibal achieved everlasting fame through the execution of his complex 
plan.  He stationed himself and one of his brothers in the center of the line with the Gauls and 
Spaniards at great personal risk.  His presence helped ensure that the center fought long enough 
for the rest of his army to bring its power to bear on the awkwardly deployed Romans and their 
hapless leader.33  The Celts and Spaniards were forced to withdraw as Hannibal had anticipated 
and drew the densely packed Romans into the awaiting jaws of Hannibal’s African infantry.  
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These troops wheeled in place and faced towards the center, and at the signal, engaged the flanks 
of the Romans.   
The Romans pressed forward so strongly against the Celts that their normally well 
disciplined fighting formations collapsed into a huge press of men that could not properly wield 
its weapons.  The formation was so deep that the troops in the rear ranks could not see or readily 
discern what was happening.  Those closer to the front lines were so hemmed in that they could 
do nothing to influence the action, many being so pressed that they could not draw or employ 
their weapons. 
Just as Hannibal had planned, his cavalry struck the decisive blow.  If the infantry had 
their foes in a death grip, the cavalry delivered the final shock.  Displaying tremendous 
discipline, the Carthaginian heavy cavalry defeated its opposite handily but rather than pursue 
came around to attack the Roman infantry in the rear.  This was the final shock to the Roman 
army.  Although its troops were credited with fighting savagely, they had been completely 
outgeneraled and were placed in a position where it was virtually impossible for them to win.  
According to the best available information, tens of thousands of Romans were killed in the 
space of several hours of fighting.  Thousands more were captured in the nearby town of Cannae, 
and perhaps just as importantly, the Roman state was denuded of its field army and thrown into a 
panic.  Hannibal was never closer to ultimate victory than after Cannae.  In a single afternoon 
Hannibal and his hodgepodge army were able to destroy nearly 50,000 Romans.34  
As time wore on and the Romans became more cautious in dealing with Hannibal, the 
spectacular victories became much harder to achieve.  The Romans displayed one of their more 
admirable traits, and that was the ability to learn and adapt from their opponents.  After a 
succession of catastrophic losses, the Romans simply stopped giving battle to Hannibal and his 
army.  This strategy succeeded in no small way owing to the fact that simply maintaining an 
army in the field was a minor victory for them.  Hannibal could not defeat what he could not 
fight, nor could he be everywhere at once.   
His strategy of trying to get Rome’s Italian allies to turn against it enjoyed some partial 
successes, but not on a large scale.35  As the Romans were able to keep many more troops under 
arms than the Carthaginians, the Roman strategy evolved from fighting Carthaginian armies 
towards that of attacking and retaking any of its allies that chose to break with the Romans.  This 
strategy on the part of the Romans proved highly successful, as the Carthaginians could not 
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defend every province that broke with Rome and maintain a credible threat against the Roman 
armies that constantly shadowed their every move. 
In the end, Hannibal was unsuccessful in getting substantial numbers of Rome’s allies to 
defect.36  His army was not strong enough, nor did it have the right equipment to capture Rome 
itself.  His lack of control of the sea-lanes helped ensure that he received only a trickle of 
reinforcements during his entire time on the Italian peninsula.  The Roman tenacity, evidenced in 
the First Punic War, and its ability to change its strategy and tactics in the face of repeated 
setbacks, effectively blocked any hope that Hannibal had of ultimate victory. 
By the year 202 B.C.E, Hannibal was effectively hemmed in on the southern end of the 
Italian peninsula.  His army was still composed of mercenaries, but was no longer made up of 
troops as reliable as those he had brought over in 218.  Although he was never defeated in Italy, 
the Romans forced him to leave just the same, owing to their invasion of Carthage that year.  
Hannibal was recalled to defend his homeland and was subsequently defeated at the battle of 
Zama, which ended the Second Punic War. 
Third Punic War 
Hannibal’s string of successes against the Romans carried with it an unintended 
consequence that would not become apparent until many years after the Second Punic War.  
Although the Romans eventually defeated him, there was a large and growing faction within the 
Roman government that believed that the Romans could never coexist with the Carthaginians.  
They would always fear a resurgent Carthage and were even more concerned about the 
appearance of another “Hannibal.” Few Roman leaders believed they could ever completely trust 
their long time rival even after the Roman victory in the Second Punic War.  The fear of Punic 
treachery was aggravated by Hannibal’s many successes that lay in whole or in part on the use of 
deception.  Polybius writes: 
But now they had given a foretaste of their future intentions in their behavior 
towards Perseus, which had involved the destruction, root and branch, of the 
Macedonian kingdom, the new policy had reached its climax in the decision 
concerning Carthage.  The Carthaginians had committed no irretrievable offence 
against their opponents, yet the Romans had inflicted penalties which were not 
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only harsh but final, even though the enemy had agreed to accept all their 
conditions and obey all their commands.37 
 Hannibal’s record of achievement proved ultimately disastrous for Carthage.  Although 
the immediate aftermath of the Second Punic War was humiliating for Carthage, it had survived 
and in fact still had most of her territories intact.  Carthage suffered the indignation of being 
required to pay a large indemnity to Rome and suffered the imposition of having Rome’s 
officials embedded in her affairs, to include passing judgment on whether Carthage could wage 
war in her own territories.  She had also suffered the loss of some territory, most notably in Spain 
and Sicily, but at least survived as a state.     
The final reckoning for Hannibal’s extraordinary success was that some 55 years after the 
Second Punic War was concluded, Carthage went to war with Rome again, but this time it was a 
war it had no hope of winning.  Although defeated, Carthage had exacted a heavy toll from 
Rome during the Second Punic War.  The Third Punic War was to carry a much heavier price for 
Carthage.  The end result was the utter destruction of Carthage as a state in 146 B.C.E., which 
can be traced directly to Hannibal’s successes in the Second Punic War and the fear he fostered 
in the minds of his enemies.  Roman leadership never got over the idea that Carthage might 
spawn another Hannibal.  Rome’s concept of warfighting and how to deal with powerful enemies 
was indelibly shaped through its dealings with Carthage in general and Hannibal in particular.38   
His influence continues to resonate. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Peers 
Hannibal’s influence on warfighters can be seen early on as Roman leadership struggled 
to divine a way to counter his tactical brilliance.  The Romans discovered that their customary 
aggressiveness and straight-ahead style of attacking regularly led to disaster.  In spite of having a 
large reservoir of manpower and solid training abilities, the traditional style of Roman warfare 
was not achieving success against Hannibal.  In what had become an ironic reversal of roles, the 
much-feared Carthaginian navy was rendered ineffective by the Roman naval effort, and the 
powerful Roman infantry was seemingly unable to best Hannibal and his troops on land. 
There are at least two examples of Hannibal’s peers whose thinking was influenced 
significantly by his actions.  The examples include two men who fought against him and who 
were relatively successful, although employing much different methods.    
The first example is Fabius Maximus who assumed command of the Roman army in 216 
B.C.E., after the Roman defeats of Trebbia and Lake Trasimene.  Fabius was not aggressive 
against Hannibal and adopted tactics that would ensure the preservation of his own army rather 
than the destruction of Hannibal’s.  Essentially Fabius adopted the strategy of shadowing 
Hannibal everywhere, but not giving pitched battle anywhere.  Fabius sought to maintain contact 
with Hannibal’s army without fighting it, and was always on the lookout for opportunities to 
attack isolated elements of Hannibal’s army, forage parties, or raiders, but never allowed himself 
to engage in a pitched battle.  Polybius writes: 
During the ensuing months he continued to move on a parallel line to the enemy, 
while he occupied in advance all those positions which he knew from his 
experience of the country to be most advantageous.  Since he could always count 
on an abundance of supplies in his rear, he never allowed his soldiers to forage or 
to become separated from the camp on any pretext.  Instead, his forces were kept 
continually concentrated, while he watched intently for whatever opportunities 
time or place might provide.  By these methods he contrived to kill or capture 
many groups of the enemy who had strayed from their camp on foraging 
expeditions.  In following these tactics he had two aims: first, to keep on reducing 
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the enemy’s limited manpower, and secondly, by means of these minor successes 
to rebuild the spirit of his own troops whose confidence had been shattered by 
their earlier defeats.  But as for fighting a pitched battle, which was what his 
opponent purposed, nothing would induce him to accept the challenge.39 
Although this strategy provided limited success it also was self-limiting and did not 
provide Fabius any opportunity to destroy Hannibal.  The Roman leadership was not satisfied 
with this style of warfare that would never produce an outright victory.  It was as if Fabius was 
playing for a tie, rather than a win.  Fabius ultimately became so unpopular with the Roman 
leadership for his “Fabian Strategy” that he was replaced by a much more aggressive general.  
The strategy implemented by Terentius Varro led to the spectacular slaughter of the Roman army 
at Cannae and the eventual vindication of Fabius and his strategy. 
The most well known example of Hannibal’s influence on a peer is that of Scipio 
Africanus who eventually led Roman armies to victory against Hannibal and Carthage.  Scipio’s 
is a classic case of a young man learning from the master and eventually employing the master’s 
tactics to defeat him. 
Polybius tells us that Scipio saved his father from death during the battle of the Ticinus 
only by an extreme act of courage.40  Scipio was also present at the crushing Roman defeat of 
Cannae.  He was one of only a few thousand to escape the day’s carnage and can only have been 
deeply impressed by the resourcefulness and tactical acumen of Hannibal.  This action surely 
provided a profound lesson in his military education. 
He was an apt learner and eventually rose to the position of consul, and was the youngest 
to assume that title.  He was so young in fact that the Romans had to modify their procedures for 
appointment to this position in order to grant him the office.  Such was his demonstrated skill 
that the Romans leadership was willing time and again to bend the rules to keep him in command 
of portions of its armies. 
Scipio absorbed the lessons that Hannibal had to teach including not only the tactical 
lessons of actually employing troops in combat but the higher lessons of strategy as well.  In 
clear-cut examples of application, he applied them by shaping a war-winning plan later in the 
Second Punic War.  He helped craft the strategy that took Roman armies to Carthage, and 
directly forestalled Carthaginian reinforcements to Italy.  He also did not succumb to fear of the 
Carthaginians but studied them and their battles in detail in order to learn their secrets of success.  
 18 
 
Polybius tells us “The result was that he was not weighed down, as most of his compatriots had 
been, either by fear of the Carthaginians or by the general feeling of dismay.”41 
In perhaps his finest example of the application of strategy, Scipio argued for and 
received permission to take the war directly to the Carthaginian homeland.42  His actions caused 
the Carthaginian government to recall Hannibal and his army from Italy, thereby achieving by 
strategic maneuver what no Roman general ever achieved in battle.  Scipio delivered the final 
lesson wherein student became teacher, defeating Hannibal on the plains of Zama southwest of 
Carthage.   
In an ironic twist, the decisive factor in his victory over Hannibal was delivered by 
Numidian cavalry which had gone over to the Romans, and had previously helped deliver so 
many of Hannibal’s victories.  In this final battle of the Second Punic War, Scipio’s cavalry 
drove its Carthaginian counterpart from the field, and then returned in a timely fashion to attack 
Hannibal’s infantry in the flank and rear and ensure the outcome of the battle.  The course of this 
battle bears resemblance to that of Hannibal’s victory at Cannae, with a key component being his 
use of cavalry to achieve victory.  He also used deception by developing tactics to negate the 
impact of Carthaginian elephants.  He utilized a formation that allowed the elephants to pass 
relatively easily through his formations rather than confronting them directly.43  These actions 
and the thinking behind them were significant for an army that traditionally relied on shock 
infantry and a direct advance to contact rather than mobile forces and ruse to achieve victory.  It 
shows a willingness to use deception reminiscent of Hannibal.  The circle was complete as 
Hannibal’s enemy used his own tactics against him to achieve a decisive victory.44 
Although not a peer, Julius Frontinus attempted to distill the essence of war for posterity, 
writing some 200 years after the death of Hannibal.  In A.D. 76 he wrote a book entitled “The 
Stratagems.”  In it he attempted to reduce military rules to a system that could be comprehended 
and put to immediate use by peers and successors. 
In the course of several hundred pages of observations and anecdotes, he provides a great 
deal of information useful to any commander.  His book was broken into three main sections; 
stratagems prior to battle, stratagems relating to battle itself, and finally stratagems pertaining to 
sieges.  In each chapter he relates specific examples that a discerning reader, one knowledgeable 
in the military arts, could put to use in a variety of circumstances.   
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In the period in which he was writing, the Roman Empire was continuing to expand and 
already held sway over huge amounts of territory and sea space.  Although the notion of 
“professional” generals as understood in the twentieth century was foreign to the Romans, it 
became obvious that appointing generals based on politics rather than skill was not a wise choice 
for an expanding empire.  This environment necessitated a body of knowledge and training that 
could be inculcated into Roman senior leadership. 
Frontinus’ book was an attempt to capture relevant information covering a wide variety 
of topics and present it in a useful format to aspiring and experienced generals.  The impact of 
the Second Punic War in general and Hannibal specifically is spread throughout the pages of the 
book.  In one example after another, Hannibal or one of his commanders is cited for some action.  
The examples are generally favorable to the Carthaginians and Hannibal, particularly where the 
use of ruse or stratagem is concerned.45   
Of particular note are those examples that pertain to gaining an understanding of one’s 
opponent in order to apply some trick against him.  The success of these types of stratagems 
depends on an in-depth knowledge of the personality of the opponent and how he would respond 
to some stimulus or action.  Where Hannibal and the Carthaginians receive less than positive 
review are those attempts at strategies that imply less than perfect character on the part of the 
Romans in their response.  An example would be Hannibal’s burning of the countryside outside 
Rome but sparing the lands of his antagonist, Fabius.  The intent was to engender more distrust 
and dislike of Fabius in the minds of the Roman people and their leadership in the Senate.  
Fabius was already out of favor for his delaying strategy that preserved his army but failed to 
engage in decisive action.  It is ironic that the Romans’ dislike of Carthaginian employment of 
deception and trickery (which are central to Frontinus’ discussion of the Carthaginians) became 
some of the key elements Scipio used to ultimately defeat Hannibal.    
In Frontinus’ book, Fabius is regarded as the genius.  He successfully stood up to 
Hannibal and perhaps even more importantly, his honor was never sullied.  In response to 
Hannibal’s tactics, Fabius had his own holdings burned in order to ensure there was no 
appearance of impropriety or wrongdoing.46  Frontinus seems to appreciate the utility of 
deception and ruse but resists the notion of it being used successfully against his fellow Romans 
whose character he regarded as above reproach. 
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Hannibal is also recognized for his ability to read and use the ground to his advantage to 
implement some type of ruse, and Frontinus clearly believes this is one of the main reasons 
Hannibal was so often victorious.  He writes: 
Again at Cannae, when Hannibal learned that the Volturnus River, at variance 
with the nature of other streams, sent out high winds in the morning, which 
carried swirling sand and dust, he so marshaled his lie of battle that the entire fury 
of the elements fell on the rear of his own troops, but struck the Romans in the 
face and eyes.  Since this difficulty was a serious obstacle to the enemy, he won 
that memorable victory. 47 
This discussion seems to show an evolving Roman mindset and appreciation for the use of 
trickery or deception to win.  Rather than displaying a disdain for the use of a ruse, Frontinus 
suggests that it would be a useful tool to help achieve victory.   
The text of this book contains several examples from the Second Punic War and it is clear 
that even though the war was nearly 300 years past, it still loomed large in the mind of at least 
one thinker on the art of war.  This is not surprising, but given the number of opponents Rome 
had faced up to that point in time it is significant that this book would reference the experiences 
of Rome dealing with Hannibal and the Carthaginians.   
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CHAPTER 4 - Middle Ages to the Renaissance 
Owing to the dearth of sources from the Middle Ages it is virtually impossible to 
establish direct links between the practitioners and writers on the subject of war to Hannibal.  
There are however numerous helpful clues and tenuous connections that would lead one to 
conclude that the shadow of the Carthaginian still influenced thinking on the art of war during 
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. 
After the fall of the Western Roman Empire to Germanic invaders, documentation 
pertaining to the evolving art of war became virtually non-existent.  During this period the 
general trend on the battlefield involved the ascendancy of the mounted arm over that of the 
infantry.  Hannibal’s reliance on his mounted forces to deliver victory into his hands was a 
foreshadowing of what was to become common practice during the Middle Ages.  Mounted 
troops established superiority over their dismounted foes during the long march of this period, as 
technological advances ensured the advantage in combat swung in favor of horse and rider. 
As one of the premier warriors of this period, and inheritor of the Frankish empire forged 
by his father, it is well documented that Charlemagne desired a mounted arm as the primary 
strike force of his army.  Although mounted troops were expensive, records show that he in fact 
wanted his “strike force” to consist of mailed cavalry.48  This is a direct result of the fact that 
well trained and armored horseman had achieved ascendancy on the battlefield and that the well 
disciplined “citizen” legions of infantry of the Romans had all but disappeared from the 
battlefield. 
The most influential work on the art of war that existed at this time was that of the 
Roman writer Vegetius.  T.R. Phillips writes, “Numerous manuscript copies of Vegetius 
circulated in the time of Charlemagne and one of them was considered a necessity of life by his 
commanders.”49  Vegetius, writing in the late 4th century, deplored the current status of arms and 
training of Late Roman armies.  His proposed solutions to the problems all center on a return to 
the ways of the “ancients.”  He believed that by returning to the organizational precepts and 
training methods of the ancients the military arts would be reinvigorated. 
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Vegetius specifically discusses Hannibal in his writings and this directly colors his 
observations on the practice of the art of war.  Referring to Hannibal’s successes, he emphasizes 
what can happen to an army that allows itself leisure and complacency.  In his references to the 
Punic Wars and Hannibal, Vegetius describes those traits necessary for success in the training 
and discipline of soldiers.  As such, it is not a stretch to state that Hannibal, through the writings 
of Vegetius, played an important part in the conduct of war during the reign of Charlemagne.  
Although Vegetius acknowledges the achievements of the Carthaginian, he does not hold 
him or his methods up for emulation.  He uses Hannibal as an example of how the failures of the 
“ancients” (the Romans) could be exploited if their previously successful methods were not 
rigidly followed.  He praises the discipline and training of the Roman armies at the height of 
their empire, and focuses on their successes as the epitome of what could be achieved with 
proper training and standards of discipline.  He specifically discusses the dearth of hard training 
and discipline failures that had overtaken the Romans after their successes in the First Punic 
War.50   
In cases where the Roman armies failed, Vegetius attributes their downfall to their failure 
to maintain their traditionally high standards of discipline, training, and selection of troops.51  In 
any event Hannibal’s successes are not attributed to any particular genius or ability of his armies, 
but cast in the light of some failure of the Romans to adhere to their previously proven training 
systems and methods of conditioning.  The only credit Hannibal is given is that of being 
insightful enough to exploit the weaknesses of the Romans.  Vegetius appears intent on 
attributing Carthaginian success to anything other than Hannibal’s genius, thereby providing the 
emperor the keys to success.  He cites the importation of Spartan advice as the reason Hannibal 
was able to defeat the Romans so often and decisively.  Referring to the First Punic War then 
transitioning to the Second, he writes:  
The extent to which military science was of benefit in the battles of the Spartans 
is made clear from the case of Xanthippus, not to mention the rest.  When he 
brought help as an individual to the Carthaginians not by courage but by skill, 
with armies that had been utterly defeated, he captured and conquered Atilius 
Regulus and an often victorious Roman army.  By triumphing in a single 
encounter, he concluded the entire campaign.  So also did Hannibal obtain the 
services of a Spartan tactician, when he was going to invade Italy.  It was due to 
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his advice that he destroyed so many consuls and legions, though inferior himself 
in numbers and strength.52 
Vegetius has nothing but disdain for the non-citizen armies of Carthage, despite their 
successes under the leadership of Hannibal.  He writes: 
However, a sense of security born of long peace has diverted mankind partly to 
the enjoyment of private leisure, partly to civilian careers.  Thus attention to 
military training obviously was at first discharged rather neglectfully, then 
omitted, until finally consigned long since to oblivion.  Neither let anyone wonder 
that this happened in the preceding age, because after the first Punic War twenty 
and more years of peace so enervated those all-conquering Romans because of 
private leisure and neglect of arms, that in the Second Punic War they could not 
stand up to Hannibal.  So it was that after so many consuls, so many generals, so 
many armies lost, they only finally achieved victory, when they had been able to 
learn military science and training.  Therefore recruits should constantly be levied 
and trained.  For it costs less to train one’s own men in arms than to hire 
mercenaries.53   
He continually extols the virtues of the “ancient” Roman system as the model to be 
followed and all his recommendations to the current emperor are slanted in that light.  He cites 
the epitome of ancient military virtue and training (the Spartans) as the model to be followed in 
training the current forces at hand.  Hannibal and his victories are cast in the light of what can 
befall those who fail to pursue military science with the vigor of the Spartans.  His notions of the 
proper composition of an army also follow that of the Roman organization during the period of 
the Republic – which is to say an infantry-heavy force composed primarily of well disciplined 
close order troops, augmented by detachments of cavalry and skirmishers.  In summary Vegetius 
sought to return to the ways of the ancient Romans in all things from training to organization and 
saw only a negative example in Hannibal. 
Writing later in the Middle Ages, Maurice, the Emperor of Byzantium (582-602 AD) 
found several positive examples in Hannibal’s campaign against Rome.  In his “Strategikon” 
(attributed to him, although there is some disagreement among scholars) he provides very 
specific and detailed advice for generals and tacticians.  Writing some 700 years after the Second 
Punic War, he refers to Hannibal in several places as the epitome of a strategist and leader. 
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Like Frontinus, Maurice addresses Hannibal’s use of disguises to confuse his enemies 
and to shield his appearance from those looking to divine his intentions.  He also describes the 
use of these stratagems as a means to inspire confidence in one’s own troops as well as awe in 
the enemy’s.  According to Maurice, the barbarians serving with Hannibal thought him a 
superior being owing to his ability to change his appearance:  “Hannibal the Carthaginian used 
wigs and varied styles of beards, so that the barbarians thought he was a supernatural being.”54   
In yet another example inspired by Hannibal’s generalship, Maurice writes of Hannibal’s 
character.  In this case he cites Hannibal as an example of a general who inspired confidence in 
his men.  He understood the value of knowing his opponent and setting the proper conditions for 
success.  In the case in point, Hannibal at one point refuses to give battle to a Roman army that 
clearly is interested in fighting.  In this instance, Maurice cites the example of Hannibal realizing 
that he was up against a much more accomplished general in Scipio, than those of previous 
opponents he had faced.  According to Maurice’s tenets, the general must be aware of the 
character and ability of his counterpart and act accordingly:   
An army is judged by the spirit of its general.  Hannibal the Carthaginian 
understood this well, for when he learned that Scipio was commanding the 
Romans, he spoke highly of the disposition of their army.  Some then criticized 
him for being so slow to march out and fight against those whom he had often 
defeated.  He defended himself by saying ‘I would prefer to deal with a troop of 
lions commanded by a deer than with a herd of deer under the leadership of a 
lion.’55    
This may be the most important characteristic emphasized by Maurice for this played to 
the strength of the Byzantines.  Surrounded by enemies of greatly different character and army 
characteristics, it was important for Byzantine commanders to have an in-depth appreciation of 
their enemies.  The strategic situation required efficient application of resources and a firm 
appreciation of one’s own strengths as well as those of the enemy.  These requirements resulted 
in the publication of several useful texts for use by Byzantine generals that specified unique 
tactics based on the qualities and characteristics of the enemy being faced.  This line of thinking 
is attributable to the qualities required of a successful general espoused in the Strategikon, and 
relies on Hannibal as one of the archetypes.56 Maurice’s discussion is yet another example of 
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Hannibal’s actions being used as a positive example for his mastery of psychology and 
deception. 
Writing during the Renaissance, Machiavelli uses Hannibal and Carthage as a negative 
model to drive home his discussions on war, the composition of armies, leaders, and the relations 
of the State to both.  Machiavelli sought as had others before him to emulate the military might 
of the ancient Romans.  As an admirer of all things Roman, he was highly critical of the state of 
current affairs pertaining to the practice of the art of war in contrast with the example of the 
Roman Empire at its height of power.57  Large, well-trained, highly-disciplined, professional 
armies were not commonly found during the time of Machiavelli and reliance on mercenaries 
had increased to a level that was unacceptable to Machiavelli.  He deplored their use in lieu of 
citizen soldiers.  He believed they were also incapable of the complex maneuvers, 
synchronization, and battlefield efficiency of the Romans by comparison.   
The nature of the armies had changed as well, particularly in the abilities of the infantry 
and the various types of troops in use.  Late in the Middle Ages the main fighting arm had 
become the heavily armed horseman.58  The infantry was relegated to a clearly secondary and 
supporting role that would have been unthinkable to the early Romans.  The well-trained and 
highly disciplined close order infantry of ancient Rome was a relic of the past.  It had also 
become reality that the wealthy and well-to-do had become reluctant to bear arms.   
To Machiavelli, these changes boded ill for Italian society.  He believed there was an 
intimate connection between the type of military fielded by a society and the virtue of that 
society.  The military was a clear reflection of the society it served.59  If the military were highly 
disciplined and full of soldiers filled with a sense of self-sacrifice, patriotism, and willingness to 
serve the state, then the state by extension must be highly virtuous and worthy of that service. 
In an attempt to address the problems with society as well as the fielding and sustainment 
of armies during this period Machiavelli captured his thoughts in a book entitled The Art of War.  
Although Machiavelli is well known for his thoughts in the political arena, his thoughts on the 
military and warfighting are equally relevant if somewhat overlooked.  He believed in the model 
of the ancient Romans and his efforts and writings were directed towards reproducing that 
standard. 
The military environment facing Florence during the time of Machiavelli could be 
characterized by constant warfare and shifting alliances.  Finding himself in the small and 
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relatively powerless principality of Florence, Machiavelli believed that a military solution was 
available to deal with the strategic situation facing his state.60  According to Machiavelli the 
necessities of creating the proper type of army had been ignored for a long time.  In his mind the 
state should never employ mercenary soldiers, which was the practice of the time.  In order to 
raise the proper types of armies, the right soldiers must be raised and these should all fit the mold 
of “citizen soldier” and provide for a well-organized militia along the lines of the Republican 
Romans.  To his thinking these were the epitome of the type of soldiers that should constitute an 
efficient, victorious army.  These troops would have a vested interest in the outcome of any 
conflict, were of the land, and would be imbued with a patriotism and discipline that would be 
virtually invincible.61      
As the antithesis of his model society and the troops it provided, Machiavelli gives us 
Hannibal and Carthage.  Citing the use of entire mercenary armies by Hannibal, Machiavelli 
scorns the very notion that Hannibal had a reasonable chance of defeating the “citizen militia” of 
Rome.  He discusses the fact that the problems with the string of Roman defeats were not the 
problem with the fighting ability of the troops but with the leadership and tactical acumen of the 
generals.  He acknowledges Hannibal’s generalship and tactical ability, but, in the same vein as 
Vegetius, he believes that the Carthaginians were a corrupt society and had no chance of 
producing armies that could defeat Rome.  They were led by leaders produced by that society 
and who were not to be admired.  He writes (referring to the extreme cruelty of Hannibal) that 
“The historians, having given little thought to this, on the one hand admire what Hannibal 
achieved, and on the other condemn what made his achievements possible.”62 
Machiavelli is also adamant about the purpose of war, and that is to defeat the enemy.  
He believed that the sole purpose of an army was to defend the society from which it came and 
that when it was committed to battle its sole purpose was to win.  He again uses Hannibal and his 
campaigns against the Romans as the negative example of how to properly use the “state’s army” 
during time of war.   
He is particularly critical of Hannibal for failing to follow up his victory at Cannae.  
According to Machiavelli, Hannibal frittered away his opportunity to win the war after crushing 
the Romans at Cannae, when success was in his grasp.63  He writes: “When one wins, one must 
follow up the victory with the utmost speed and in this case imitate Caesar and not Hannibal, 
who, by staying put after he had beaten the Romans at Cannae, lost the empire of Rome.64   
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In Machiavelli’s eyes Hannibal’s only real chance of winning the confrontation with 
Rome was wasted on the pursuit of a deficient strategy, with tools that were not adequate to the 
task from the beginning.  He believed that Hannibal was intent on applying enough pressure to 
the Romans to induce negotiations rather than defeating them outright and occupying their 
principal city.  His writing also speaks to Hannibal’s “cruelty” and calls it a primary reason for 
his many successes, but not enough to ensure victory in the long run against the Romans.65  
Carthage and its mercenary soldiers never had the stake in the outcome of the war that Rome and 
its citizen soldiers had.  The Carthaginians, for all Hannibal’s tactical brilliance, had only a 
fleeting opportunity to win in a confrontation with the resources and virtue of a state like Rome. 
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CHAPTER 5 - Napoleon 
In his writings Napoleon mentions seven generals worthy of study.  He counted Hannibal 
among a small universe of stars and is quoted as saying “The principles of Caesar were the same 
as those of Hannibal: to keep his forces assembled, to be vulnerable at no point, to move with 
speed to important points, to make use of moral resources, of the reputation of his arms, of the 
fear that he inspired as well as of political means to maintain the fidelity of his allies, and the 
obedience of conquered peoples.”  
Napoleon recommended that anyone desiring to be a great captain would do well to study 
the campaigns of the following generals – Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus-Adolphus, 
Turenne, Prince Eugene, and Frederick the Great.  Accordingly he believed that the study of 
these would yield a “complete treatise” on the art of war.  He was a voracious reader and student 
of military arts.  He deemed Hannibal among the luminaries he described as most worthy of 
extensive study and emulation.66  His chief admiration of Hannibal was the application of 
audacious maneuver and the destruction of enemy forces, which Napoleon attempted at every 
opportunity.  Napoleon’s model advocated rapid maneuver and complete familiarity with the 
terrain in order to bring the enemy to battle in a position least favorable to them, much the same 
as Hannibal’s philosophy.67  Napoleon writes of Hannibal’s march into Italy: 
It took him five months to make this march of 400 leagues.  He left no garrison or 
depot in the rear, nor did he preserve his communications with Spain or Carthage 
until after the battle of Trasimene.  No more vast or extended plan has been 
executed by man.  Alexander’s expedition was not nearly so bold and was much 
easier: he had many more chances of success.  It was wiser!68 
Upon reading Napoleon’s own words it is clear that he admired Hannibal for his tactical 
ability.  There are no comments on the success of his strategy or how he conducted himself as a 
statesman.  There is no discussion as to how well Hannibal linked tactics to strategy or how well 
or how close he came to actually winning his war.  Napoleon’s gleanings from Hannibal’s 
campaigns do not appear to focus at all on the linkages between the art of grand strategy and 
achieving some ultimate stable end-state favorable to the nation.  What becomes clear in 
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Napoleon’s writings are the value he places on Hannibal’s tactical ability to outthink his 
opponents, outmaneuver them, and conduct operations in such a manner as to keep his opponents 
always reacting to his initiative.  There are no mentions of Hannibal’s missteps.  There is no 
discussion of Hannibal’s failure to connect an amazing string of tactical victories into something 
greater.  Napoleon apparently fell into the same trap and committed many of the same errors as 
Hannibal.  He became a master of tactics and operations but still failed to connect them to 
strategy and he ultimately failed, as did Hannibal. 
He extolled Hannibal’s ability to succeed without leaving his lines of communication 
open.  He regards Hannibal’s ability to live off the land in Italy without support from Carthage 
for some 15 years as a signal achievement.  Napoleon writes: 
Hannibal’s principle was to keep his troops united, to have a garrison only in one 
captured fortress which he preserved in good condition in order to keep his 
hostages, large machines, distinguished prisoners, and his sick, leaving his 
communications the responsibility of his allies.  He maintained himself in Italy 
for fifteen years without receiving any help from Carthage and evacuated it only 
under the orders of his government to fly to the defense of his own country.  
Fortune betrayed him at Zama and Carthage ceased to exist.  But had he been 
defeated at the Trebbia, Trasimene, or at the Cannae, what worse things could 
have happened to him?  Defeated at the gates of the capital, he could not keep his 
army from entire destruction.  And had he left half of his army or even a third at 
the first and second bases, could he have been victorious at the Trebbia at Cannae, 
or at Trasimene?  No!  All would have been lost, even his armies in reserve.  
History would know nothing about him.69   
It is apparent that Napoleon appreciated Hannibal’s tactical savvy on how best to employ 
the troops he had at his disposal.  He constantly had to adjust his plan to the strengths of the 
various contingents of troops in his army.  Normally after a masterful march to take advantage of 
some aspect of the terrain, weather, or personality of an opponent there was still the critical 
matter of disposing the troops in a manner that would ensure their greatest contribution to the 
coming battle.   
These are problems that Napoleon had to deal with as well, and if his armies were 
somewhat more homogenous than Hannibal’s, he still had the issues of coordinating the various 
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arms in such a manner as to yield the highest efficiency in combat.  This situation also changed 
during Napoleon’s lifetime.  Although his intent was to establish and maintain a national army, 
the cost of his battles and campaigns forced him to change.  He was eventually forced to mitigate 
the increasing drain on manpower by increasing use of large contingents of mercenary and allied 
troops.  Hannibal would have been well acquainted with these issues. 
Napoleon’s focus was normally on how to destroy the enemy army rather than occupy 
key terrain or the enemy capital.  His actions were characterized by the offensive, maintenance 
of the initiative, and decisive action to keep the enemy off balance.   His sense of timing and 
perception of the battlefield was superb and was the difference between success and failure in 
many of his battles.  His keys to success as distilled by J.F.C. Fuller were unity of command, 
generalship and soldiership, and planning.70  The influence of Hannibal’s campaigning and 
tactics are apparent. 
Another similarity between the two generals and an offshoot of the influence of Hannibal 
was Napoleon’s thinking on the use cavalry.  Napoleon sought to turn his heavy cavalry arm into 
an arm of decision for his army.  Just as the real hammer in Hannibal’s army was the mounted 
arm, Napoleon’s intention in reforming the mounted arm of his forces was to make it capable of 
being a main striking force.71   
Although Napoleon considered Hannibal one of his main sources of inspiration chosen 
from a very select few, it is worth noting the differences in circumstances facing the two 
generals.  There were significant discrepancies between the military and cultural environments in 
which the two generals labored.  For all the appreciation of certain aspects of Hannibal’s abilities 
and his warfighting examples, Napoleon faced circumstances of environment, politics, and 
technology that were quite different than those in which Hannibal labored.    
Chief among these differences is that Napoleon was one of the first generals to enjoy the 
benefits of a “nation under arms.”  This concept essentially mobilized, or had the potential to 
mobilize, the entire military age manpower of a nation.  It provided a seemingly unlimited 
capacity to absorb and then replace losses.72  Napoleon’s absolute power and the immense 
manpower and resources available to him in France allowed him to conduct operations relatively 
secure in the notion that losses would be replaced and new resources obtained.  It was virtually a 
given that Napoleon would be able to make good the losses he sustained.  This idea would have 
been completely foreign to the Carthaginian commander.   
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The final evidence of Hannibal’s impact on Napoleon is the latter’s implementation and 
understanding of generalship.  Napoleon appears to have valued the same character and attributes 
of a general as modeled by Hannibal, among others.  This example from Napoleon’s writings 
includes the fact that he considered the general and his presence, both physical and mental, to be 
paramount to the conduct and performance of the army.  Napoleon states:  
In war men are nothing; one man is everything.  The presence of the general is 
indispensable.  He is the head, the whole of the army.  It was not the Roman army 
that subdued Gaul, but Caesar; not the Carthaginian army that caused the republic 
to tremble at the gates of Rome, but Hannibal; not the Macedonian army that 
reached the Indus, but Alexander; … In war only the commander understands the 
importance of certain things, and he alone, through his will and superior insight, 
conquers and surmounts all difficulties.  An army is nothing without the head.73   
Napoleon clearly believes that like Hannibal, he was the centerpiece and main arbiter of 
success of the army.  It seems clear from his writings that he believes that the general is the key 
component to success regardless of composition of the army, and he considered himself in the 
same league as those luminaries he deemed worthy of study.   
A contemporary of Napoleon’s but with a more strategic outlook, Carl von Clausewitz 
writes on Hannibal in a context that does not use the Carthaginian or any of his battles as 
examples of things to be emulated.  Just the opposite is true.  Clausewitz states that the battles of 
the ancients are too far removed to be of use in detailed study.   The arms, equipment and tactics 
do not warrant consideration.   
Consistent with the thrust of his writings Clausewitz does make note of the wisdom of the 
Romans in the strategic conduct of their war with Hannibal.  Whereas Napoleon focused 
primarily on the conduct of battles, training and organization for combat, Clausewitz was more 
concerned with the strategic outcome of those battles – why they were being fought and how 
they contributed to the desired strategic end state of winning the war.  He particularly lauds the 
Roman decisions to carry the war to other theatres – Spain and Africa, even as Hannibal and his 
armies were still roaming the Italian peninsula.   
In this context, Hannibal’s conduct of the war is seen as having relevance to the military 
thinker at the strategic level.  The real lesson that is worthy of study is how Hannibal’s 
opponents bested him from a strategic perspective.  Clausewitz writes, “The memorable way in 
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which the Romans in the Second Punic War attacked the Carthaginian possessions in Spain and 
Africa, while Hannibal still maintained himself in Italy, is a most instructive subject to study, as 
the general relations of the States and Armies concerned in the indirect act of defense are 
sufficiently well known.”74  His comments state that the most important aspect of study is the 
strategic picture, not the troops or the battles, but why Carthage failed to turn tactical success 
into long-term victory. 
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CHAPTER 6 - The Great General Staff  
There is an unmistakable influence of Hannibal on the strategic and tactical thinking of 
the German Great General Staff (GGS).  Perhaps with more than any other association of 
military thinkers, Hannibal’s influence looms largest on the thought process and development of 
the GGS in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
This influence becomes apparent upon scrutiny of various writers during this period.   As 
the Chief of the GGS, General Helmuth von Moltke provided oversight and revision of the 
training and development of the German warfighting staff from 1857-1887.  Germany’s military 
was faced with a strategic situation that called for the development and application of a strategy 
that would set the conditions and allow for the consummation of battles of annihilation.  The 
central position of the German state, surrounded by increasingly hostile enemies planted the 
seeds for the creation of a deliberate, deep looking warfighting strategy.  In the words of Arden 
Bucholz on the strategic situation confronting Germany, “To the southeast stood the Habsburgs, 
a world power since the 15th century.  To the west stood the Second French Republic which 
harbored the traditions of Napoleonic imperialism.  Both were recently defeated and therefore 
dangerous neighbors.  To the east stood the armies of the Romanovs who had sacked and burned 
Berlin in the previous century.”75   
The strategic setting in Europe had changed significantly towards the end of the 19th 
century.  The enemies of Germany possessed resources of manpower and material that Germany 
could not hope to match in a protracted campaign.  Although being in a central position did have 
some advantages, it also posed several perils.  Being surrounded on all sides by enemies required 
preparation for war on several fronts in a simultaneous or near-simultaneous manner.  Therefore 
the peace-time requirement for Germany became the development of plans with sufficient detail 
and synchronization to ensure timely success on one front while buying time on another.76  It 
then required provision for rapid re-deployment of forces from one front to another.   Although 
war might not be the optimum choice for Germany, it would have to be a viable option given the 
history of the region and regular resort to warfare to settle issues. 
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During the Napoleonic wars, one of the lessons Prussia learned was that failing to act 
quickly and decisively could have disastrous long-term consequences, particularly for a nation 
easily accessible to its enemies.  This fact led Prussian leadership to conclude that any future 
conflicts would have to be fought quickly and produce decisive results.  The German staff 
envisioned fighting a two front war in the East and West against enemies who would require 
varying amounts of time to mobilize, thereby allowing Germany to exploit her central position.77    
When General Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) inherited stewardship of the GGS in 
1857, he instituted a form of war planning that required expertly trained staff officers to plan 
deeply into the future, visualizing and implementing plans to a level of detail unheard of 
previously.  It set the stage to broaden the scope from what had previously involved armies of 
hundreds of thousands to become armies of millions in the First World War.  The logistics and 
planning efforts to sustain, move, command and control forces of this size were staggering.  
Remembering the defeats administered to them by the “new” kind of French army during the 
early 1800’s, the Prussians set about developing their own “new” army which took the better part 
of a century to fully blossom.78 
Alfred von Schlieffen inherited this background of evolving planning methods and 
preparations for war.  Born in 1833, he came of age in the Prussian Army in the late 19th century.  
Following a successful career as a troop commander, he eventually found himself in charge of 
the GGS.  His background and training under General Moltke and the Prussian system of making 
war established the foundation of the German war planning effort for World War I.   
Schlieffen conceived a plan based in large measure on his studies of the battle of Cannae, 
Hannibal’s greatest victory.  Although there is dispute among historians as to whether there 
actually was a codified “Schlieffen Plan,” there is abundant evidence that Schlieffen’s thinking 
about the conduct of war was highly influenced by Hannibal, and more specifically Cannae.79  
The Schlieffen Plan that the Germans intended to execute in 1914 was and perhaps still is the 
greatest example of the impact of Hannibalic thinking on the practice of war.  Regardless of 
author, the war plan sought to allow the Germans to win on one front while holding on another, 
and then transfer forces to win on the second front.  The method of victory was intended to be 
the annihilation of the enemy by flank and rear attacks, even if the army had to create a flank 
where none existed.80  In this war plan, the Germans attempted to replicate, on an operational 
level, the stunning tactical success of Hannibal’s victory at Cannae.  Typical of thought during 
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this period, General Erich Ludendorff writes in his memoirs that “… annihilating battles have 
double weight – they hit the enemy dearly and detract little from one’s own strength.”81 
Upon assuming the position as chief of the GGS in 1891, Schlieffen sought to improve 
the system of planning he had inherited from Helmuth von Moltke and Alfred von Waldersee 
and set about implementing several reforms.  The reforms included streamlining the organization 
of the staff and implementing a new style of planning intended to forecast one’s own moves 
versus those of the enemy well into the future.  This type of planning required technical and 
mathematical skills in order to quantify as much as possible the science of warfighting.  No 
element of the plan would be left chance.  It required calculation of exact ratios of troops, 
distances to be moved, terrain, availability of mobility assets and all other manner of 
requirements in order to determine the requirements for victory.  It required planning to a level 
of detail that had previously been unheard of until the late 19th century.   Along with 
developing the techniques of detailed planning, Schlieffen also sought to cultivate in the German 
Army and the GGS the imperative of waging battles of annihilation.82  In order to instill this 
concept into the minds of German generals, Schlieffen chose Hannibal’s victory at Cannae as the 
prototypical example of this form of battle.  He determined to integrate this type of warfare into 
the mindset and training of all German generals.  Given the strategic setting that the German 
army faced, the reality was that Germany could not settle for victories that did not produce rapid, 
decisive results.83  Schlieffen’s writings indicate he believed that battles that did not result in the 
outright destruction of Germany’s foes only invited the “defeated” army to return at a later date 
with renewed vigor and strength.  Those nominally defeated armies would have to be fought 
again and again if they were not destroyed outright.  The reality of the situation was that 
Germany could not afford to engage in battles of attrition with its more numerous enemies.84 
In order to provide his officers the background to his thinking Schlieffen needed a 
concrete example from which to teach.  As a student of military history, Schlieffen was well-
acquainted with and enamored of the decisive style of battle waged by Hannibal.  Hannibal’s 
battles frequently yielded results similar to those the Germans would need if they had hope of 
expeditiously defeating multiple enemies on far ranging fronts.  In Schlieffen’s own words he 
chose Cannae as the model he would use to train his officers, “The battle of extermination may 
be fought today according to the same plan as elaborated by Hannibal in long forgotten times.”85  
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Cannae provided the Germans – who were regularly outnumbered - a concrete example of how 
their current strategic situation might be alleviated.   
Hannibal’s victory at Cannae was mesmerizing to the Germans because it illustrated 
being able to fight and win when outnumbered.  It provided a tangible example of being able to 
appear disadvantaged on paper, and yet not just defeat the enemy, but achieve a battle of 
annihilation.  It decisively demonstrated how a well trained, well led, smaller combined arms 
force could successfully defeat a much larger foe.   
This notion came to represent the mark of ultimate success for a German general and 
became a cornerstone in the education of the GGS.  Based on Schlieffen’s intent, it was not 
going to be good enough to deliver what he termed an “ordinary” victory.  Setting the conditions 
to execute a battle of annihilation came to represent not just a desirable achievement in battle, 
but would ultimately determine whether Germany could live or die as a state, surrounded as it 
was by enemies who were growing in power after 1890.  General Ludendorff stated: 
“Annihilation of hostile armies has become an immutable principle for conduct of all wars, and 
to bear it in mind is the first task to be carried out in totalitarian war.”86   
In the overhaul of the Great General Staff, the study of how to achieve battles of 
annihilation became paramount in the curriculum.  The overriding desire of the leadership of the 
GGS became that of inculcating the constant desire, competence, and skill to bring to conclusion 
these types of battles.   The circumstances encompassing the tactical battle of Cannae seemed to 
fit almost perfectly the strategic conditions confronting Germany and would provide the 
foundation on which to build a strategy for success in any future war.  
 Hannibal’s army was significantly outnumbered overall, and in most categories of 
measure during the time, should have been at a relative disadvantage in the fight.  He was 
outnumbered over two to one in heavy infantry, which was the strength of the Roman Army.  In 
overall troops, the Romans possessed the advantage of some 80,000 to 50,000.87  Of Hannibal’s 
heavy infantry, only about 12,000 were actually the equivalent of their Roman counterparts who 
numbered some 55,000.  This disparity in numbers became a metaphor of the strategic situation 
facing Schlieffen.   
The only area in which Hannibal had a marked advantage was in the disposition of 
cavalry (both in numbers and quality) in which he had approximately 10,000 versus 6,000 for the 
Romans.  Schlieffen’s focus on operational mobility looked to achieve a similar advantage by 
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sending a “… powerful German right wing swinging around the fortified Franco-German border.  
This would take the French Army in the rear and force it to fight a battle on unfavorable 
terms.”88  Reproducing the stunning success of Cannae was seen by Schlieffen as the key to the 
strategic problems faced by Germany.  The promise of this type of victory is what motivated 
Schlieffen to apparently try to emulate it on a much larger scale (strategic), compared to 
Hannibal’s tactical encirclement. 
In spite of Hannibal’s tactical victory at Cannae, it did not provide any of the sought after 
strategic results (seemingly ignored by Schlieffen).89  Schlieffen appears to have believed that by 
modeling the tactical success of Hannibal at the strategic level, Germany could in fact achieve a 
stunning victory over its opponents in the west in a short period of time.  This would then allow 
the Germans to mass the bulk of their armies against their enemies in the east.  This attempt to 
capture Hannibal’s success on a grand scale was manifested in the Schlieffen Plan of World War 
I. 
During Schlieffen’s tenure as head of the GGS he commissioned a complete study of the 
battle of Cannae and its bearing and relationship to several previous campaigns and battles.  He 
sought to draw the parallels from the ancient examples with those of his contemporaries in order 
to capture the lessons for application in the future.  For the subjects of his study he chose the 
campaigns of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, as well as the campaign against Austria in 
1866.  For the final comparison, he chose to look at the Franco-Prussian War during 1870-1871. 
In each of the sections of Schlieffen’s study, he compared the actions of the protagonists 
to the combatants in the battle of Cannae.  He sought to validate the overarching principles of 
Cannae against specific opportunities in which his own country and selected enemies either 
failed to employ those principles or were able to execute them.  In most cases, the examinations 
yielded negative results and highlighted the fact that most generals would not be able to 
consummate another Cannae for a variety of reasons.   
Chief among these reasons is the notion that most generals would fail to seize the 
opportunities presented them.  An even larger consideration is making the chief objective of any 
attack the flanks or rear of the enemy.  In Schlieffen’s mind, the chief obstacle to success was to 
get his generals to always think in terms of attacking the rear or a flank.  It required imagination 
and audacity to press for these types of conditions and it was not second nature to many of the 
generals to think in these terms.  In every example, Schlieffen cited the reasons why the generals 
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y.  In 
he 
failed and provided a remedy to the problem and demonstrated how the individual failed to seize 
an opportunity to attack an exposed flank or rear.  The central theme of the book was to examine 
how one might consistently turn a “normal” battle into a battle of annihilation. 
Owing to the environment that he was operating in and the tradition of detailed planning 
bequeathed from his predecessors, particularly Moltke, Schlieffen judged that failure in battle 
was due to lack of proper planning, lack of audacity and failure to recognize the situation as it 
was presented.90  In the discussion of Cannae, the battle is dissected into its many subordinate 
parts, and Schlieffen shows his faith above all else that, “The battle of extermination may be 
fought today according to the plan as elaborated by Hannibal in long forgotten times.”91   
The victory appealed to Schlieffen because it seemed to confound all the current theories.  
That the outnumbered force could in fact win and win decisively ran counter to prevailing notion 
that the weaker force could not attack “concentrically” and should not try to attack on the 
wings.92  Another aspect that appealed to Schlieffen was the notion that the smaller force might 
not necessarily be superior to the larger in all areas but could still win if the proper conditions 
were set.  At any rate, the prevailing belief was that the decisive blow must be delivered against 
the flanks or rear of an enemy. 
Schlieffen believed that the future fight would be a “struggle for the flanks.”93  
Therefore, all effort must be expended to achieve victory there vice the front of the enem
the examination of Napoleon and Frederick, Schlieffen cites several instances that buttress t
notion that the true lesson to be gained is that one or more flanks must always be attacked, the 
enemy must be turned out of his position and that the only way to achieve destruction of the 
enemy was through a rear or flank attack.  He writes that “Frederick the Great failed in many a 
battle of annihilation, because his forces were too small and he had nevertheless dared the 
utmost.  Napoleon failed at Prussian-Eylau because he had spent too much on a frontal attack, 
left too much in reserve and used too little on the decisive flank attack.”94   
Schlieffen cites several examples including Leuthen and Zorndorf to support his thesis.  It 
is also hard to miss the fact that the GGS, particularly Schlieffen, identified strongly with 
Frederick.  The circumstances facing Prussia were quite similar to those facing Germany in the 
late nineteenth and early 20th century – surrounded by numerically larger foes (Russia and 
France), operating on interior lines, and being unable to mobilize forces to match the size of her 
enemies.95  It is apparent that Schlieffen considered Cannae the benchmark with which to 
 39 
 
compare all other battles and that their degree of merit for the commander was directly 
proportional to how well they mirrored Hannibal’s achievement. 
In many ways, the example of Frederick provides many parallels with that of Hannibal in 
Italy and it is easy to see why Schlieffen would concatenate the two.  Hannibal was operating 
virtually surrounded in a hostile land and could never hope to match his foes man for man.  What 
he could not achieve in raw numbers and resources he could hope to offset through superior 
tactics.  All these militated for achieving decisive victories with smaller forces in battles of 
annihilation.  According to Schlieffen “It may be seen from all the battles, won or lost by 
Frederick the Great, that his aim was to attack from the very beginning a flank or even the rear of 
the enemy, to push him if possible against an insurmountable obstacle and then to annihilate him 
by enveloping one or both of his flanks.”96  
The second area of Schlieffen’s examination and relation to Cannae was that of 
Napoleon.  Although Schlieffen, his contemporaries and history have judged Napoleon one of 
the greatest generals, Schlieffen found numerous flaws in Napoleon’s battles when judged 
against the standards of Cannae.  He also cites specific instances during Napoleon’s career where 
he exhibited those characteristics that led to decisive battles.  However later in Napoleon’s 
career, Schlieffen maintains that Napoleon was a different sort of commander and failed to 
exhibit those requirements necessary for decisive battle.  The decisiveness of previous battles 
was absent and the results failed to live up to the standards he had set early in his career.  “The 
day of Prussian-Eylau marked a turning point in Napoleon’s life as a general.  The series of 
annihilating battles – Marengo, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena – does not continue.”97 
Napoleon is lauded for his planning and his “large turning movements” which would 
begin days and weeks in advance of the actual battle as the conditions were being set.98  He also 
noted that even in battles where the situation had turned awry, victory was still possible if the 
object of the main attack was still the flank or rear.99  He praises Napoleon in his early 
campaigns for realizing that battle and victory was necessary and not simply some contest to 
outmaneuver the enemy.  The concept of decisive battle was an emerging paradigm.  Napoleon’s 
examples provided ample fodder to bolster Schlieffen’s thinking on battles of annihilation.  He 
was audacious in thought and decisive in execution and expected his subordinates to execute his 
will.100  In Schlieffen’s calculus, the strategic circumstances facing Germany required nothing 
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short of a knockout blow.101  Even though enjoying an interior position, Germany still had too 
many strategic challenges to allow for anything but decisively defeating its enemies.     
Schlieffen takes Napoleon to task for failing to exploit opportunities presented to him late 
in his career.  In Schlieffen’s eyes, Napoleon had gone from being bold and audacious to a point 
where he missed many situations that could have been exploited with decisive consequences.  In 
Schlieffen’s strongest criticism, he cites Napoleon’s greatest failure at Waterloo to be an 
example of failing to apply the principles gleaned from Cannae.  The prequel to Waterloo at 
Ligny in 1815 provided Napoleon ample opportunity to decisively defeat the Prussians thereby 
rendering half the coalition out of the fight and setting up Napoleon for victory.   
Writing with explicit reference to Cannae, Schlieffen criticizes Napoleon for failing to 
choose the ground wisely, and taking up a position that rendered his forces ineffective against the 
Prussians.  Schlieffen writes:  
This however did not compensate for the disadvantage of a narrow front and a 
deep flank.  The position was worthy of a Terentius Varro.  It was bound to be 
surrounded whether the adversary wanted to or not.  One flank he was forced to 
envelop. To envelop both was an easy matter.  Should the latter take place the 
defense was lost.  Should there also be a Hasdrubal for attacking the rear, for 
which no less than three cavalry corps ought to have been made available, the 
highest aim would have been attained.  On the eve of his fall, Napoleon was given 
an opportunity for a battle of annihilation such as had not arisen during the 19 
years of his career.102   
“In the final analysis Napoleon had left the road which brought him to his great victories 
(annihilation).”103  Waterloo is compared to the Battle of Marengo some 15 years earlier which 
was not a well-conducted fight by either side and resulted in great casualties on both sides.  It 
was primarily a head on clash with indecisive results.  This was exactly the type of battle that 
Schlieffen intended his generals to avoid.  Although it contained elements of a Cannae, it was not 
fully developed and a great opportunity missed.   
In a separate assertion, Schlieffen states that the battle of Leipzig could have been 
another Cannae, had not the Allied generals been so in awe of Napoleon’s reputation.  He cites 
evidence that generals failed to seize and maintain the initiative and thereby lost a great chance 
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to defeat Napoleon.  In this battle, the allies missed the chance with some 350,000 men to utterly 
destroy Napoleon’s army of 200,000, all because of fear of Napoleon.104   
In the chapter dealing with the Prussians, Schlieffen contrasts their performance with that 
of Napoleon some 50 years earlier.  If Napoleon had gradually lost his imagination and desire to 
execute battles of destruction, the baton was seemingly passed to the Prussians.  However, even 
they failed to see and act in a completely decisive manner.  According to Schlieffen, the Prussian 
generals were too set in their ways to accept the principles that Moltke wanted to instill in 
them.105 
Part of the problem lay in the fact that for all their excellence the Prussian generals were 
too stodgy and unimaginative in their grasp of how to conduct battle.  They had apparently 
absorbed many lessons from the Napoleonic wars but Schlieffen states they were all the wrong 
ones.  They represented the notion that the proper way to conduct a battle was for one side to 
take up a position – generally the numerically weaker side, then the other with a battalion or two 
more would attack in a head on fight.106 
The Cannae study makes the claims that the Prussian generals were incapable of 
“…entering into the cycle of ideas of the gray-haired theorist who had never commanded even a 
company (Moltke).”107  They were incapable of truly seeing the battlefield, preparing it, and 
exploiting its possibilities.  It states that the Prussians were irretrievably mired in an old mindset. 
The main point of discussion in the chapter is that if the generals had listened to the 
advice of Moltke, they could have won an easy battle in the manner of Cannae on June 25th, 
during the Austro-Prussia War of 1866.  However, because they could not visualize the 
possibilities and discounted Moltke’s suggestion, they lost the opportunity.  In spite of 
themselves and owing to the iron will of Moltke, the Prussians were led towards victory.  The 
description of the battle (Langensalza) says it developed in exactly the same manner as Cannae.  
The battle saw an early victory by Austrian troops in the center of the line similar to that of 
Varro over Hannibal’s Spaniards and Gauls at Cannae.  This act was necessary for the Prussians 
to then deliver the decisive blow to the previously unexposed flanks of the enemy on the 28th.  
The victory on the 28th is described as “corresponding to the ancient program of the Aufidus 
(reference to the site of the battle of Cannae).”108  It provided another seemingly ironclad 
successful application of the principals gleaned from Cannae. 
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The final example in the study is that of the German campaign against the French in 
1870-1871.  In one example after another the failure to think as a Hannibal at Cannae is exposed.  
First the French, then the Germans miss opportunity after opportunity to surround and destroy 
the enemy.  Timidity, fear, even downright terror are characterized as the main reasons for 
failing to act in a manner that will achieve annihilation in battle. 
Schlieffen uses the example of Napoleon in the autumn of 1813 to emphasize the point 
that those who fail to seize the opportunity to surround may themselves fall victim to the same 
fate.  According to Schlieffen: 
He (Napoleon) found himself in the minority and determined that … the weakest 
and decisive point was the front, and assembled against it his not inconsiderable 
forces.  An heroic, a superhuman attack, an annihilating piercing should be 
executed.  The future depended on it, it had to decide if the world was to be once 
more turned upside down.  The monstrous attack broke as so many of those 
preceding it had done.  And then the inevitable occurred.  The man, who did not 
wish to surround, was surrounded on both sides, pressed together, encircled and 
would have been annihilated if pale fear had not left a back door open to the terror 
inspiring one (Leipzig).109 
This chapter provides yet another example of how a general should not fail to take the 
initiative and strike for the flanks.  In this scenario, not only does he not achieve the results he 
might have, but even more is at stake.  The general failing to act has his flanks attacked with 
terrible consequences.  In this example, Schlieffen makes the argument that whether the general 
is stronger or weaker, if he does not strike for the flanks, the tables will be turned on him.  He 
makes the even broader claim that if the general does not seek to envelop both flanks he exposes 
himself to being attacked on the other flank.110  This concept is so strongly endorsed that the 
study goes on to refute Napoleon’s phrase that “the stronger conquers.”  The final analysis comes 
through quite clear.  And that is that in spite of numerical weakness, it is possible to gain a battle 
of annihilation if one seizes a Cannae or Prague (Frederick 1757).111   
The final section of Schlieffen’s study included detailed maps associated with the key 
European conflicts in the 18th and 19th centuries.  In each of the chapters of the book, Schlieffen 
highlights example after example of how the principles of Cannae were either applied or 
misapplied to case studies of historic battles.  In every case the reasoning is biased towards a 
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favorable application of Cannae to the circumstances at hand.  In no case does Schlieffen 
acknowledge that Cannae might not be the best example followed.  However, this is to be 
expected as the battle of Cannae provides the most clear cut example of how a weaker army 
might defeat a stronger – which is the example the Germans needed.  Looking at the strategic 
conditions facing Germany as Schlieffen knew them – he needed to distill principles that might 
be applied in a variety of circumstances, always yielding success. 
Cannae provided an answer to the strategic circumstances confronting Germany.  It fit all 
the requirements – the ability to fight outnumbered and win, the path to decisive victory, 
provision for well led “superior” troops to prevail over masses of “lesser quality” stock.  It also 
carried with it the romantic tradition of the underdog, winning in spite of all odds and not just 
eking out a victory but delivering a smashing victory over innumerable foes.  All these 
circumstances contributed to the appeal of Cannae to the head of the Great General Staff. 
This lengthy study of Cannae led to the development of the Schlieffen plan that formed 
the foundation of the initial German war effort in the west in the First World War.  The 
Schlieffen plan sought to implement nearly every aspect of the knowledge gleaned from the 
study of Cannae.  In every aspect of the planning the idea was to implement the critical elements 
of Hannibal’s most significant victory.  The plan included a thinned center to lure the enemy 
forward in an initial false sense of victory.  It included provision for massive attacks on one flank 
and the rear of the enemy army by forces seeking to surround and annihilate the masses of 
confused and hopeless enemy. 
The plan as envisioned and as attempted was exceedingly complex.  Although it can be 
argued that Hannibal’s plan was complex, Schlieffen’s was orders of magnitude greater.  It 
required immense reliance on timing.  It required a tremendous amount of coordination and 
detailed planning from the German Railroad Section.  The railroads were the keys to victory in 
the Schlieffen plan and were to provide the means of implementation on a grand operational 
level what Hannibal had achieved on a much smaller tactical level.   
The plan relied heavily on assumptions including the idea that an inadequate Russian 
mobilization system would retard the deployment of the Russian Army.  The main effort 
required that the Dutch and Belgian rail system (the most dense rail system at that time) would 
be available for use by the Germans.  These rail systems would be required to complete the huge 
turning movement to the north and west as envisioned by Schlieffen.  It assumed that the British 
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and French would be surprised by German actions and would not be able to react in a manner to 
thwart the intended German advance.  It also hinged on the idea that the Anglo/French Army 
would be destroyed in a thirty to forty day timeframe.  The plan also assumed that the weakened 
center of his armies would be able to hold out against an ambitious French thrust until the 
combat power on his right flank could be brought to bear.  In short, it was very ambitious and 
required that numerous assumptions all held true.  That time was a critical component to all 
aspects of the plan is an understatement.  Schlieffen and his planners counted on a “time 
advantage” over their opponents on all fronts measured in days rather than weeks.112 
The detailed planning and coordination was to be delivered by the specialized officers of 
the Great General Staff.  Schlieffen spent years developing the technical expertise in the officer 
corps to undertake such a huge and risky planning effort.  Perhaps Schlieffen’s greatest 
contribution to the development of the GGS officer was the inculcation of the mindset of 
“annihilation” predicated on the principles of Cannae.113  There were also numerous other 
aspects in the development of the GGS officer including mathematics, mapmaking, engineering 
skills, technology, and use of the case study method.  Schlieffen made the determination that the 
only study worthy of the GGS officer was that of annihilation.114  It provided the compass point 
to which all other efforts were oriented. 
As it turned out the Schlieffen Plan as envisioned was a resounding failure.  For all the 
planning efforts, staff rides, wargames, case studies and technical training, it did not materialize 
as planned.  There were too many assumptions, too many unknowns that were out of the hands 
of the Germans to control.  The initial attacks went well enough but almost immediately the time 
schedule was thrown off.115 
The French and particularly the Belgians fought much harder than anticipated and 
succeeded in delaying the advance sufficiently to irredeemably throw the schedule off pace.  The 
British mobilized much quicker than expected and although their army was fairly small, it was 
well equipped and gave an excellent account of itself.  Of particular hindrance to the German 
plan was the fact that the Russians mobilized much quicker than expected as well.  The 
Schlieffen plan assumed that the Russians would be much slower in mobilizing than actually 
occurred.  Another key contributor was the fact that the Germans did not have sufficient 
manpower to strengthen the right wing of their army to achieve the goals they envisioned for it.   
 45 
 
The end result was the gradual grinding down of the offensive.  As pointed out, the 
Russians threatened earlier than planned, the British moved much more quickly than anticipated 
and the French were not surprised as intended.  The plan did not work, and Schlieffen’s attempt 
to deliver a modern Cannae did not materialize. 
Of note is the commentary in the United States Army, Command and General Staff 
College reprint of Schlieffen’s Cannae battle studies.  It was reprinted in 1931, 13 years after the 
war, and over 17 years after the failed attempt to recreate Cannae.  In the forward, General Baron 
Von Freytag-Loringhaven states that he believes the real reason Schlieffen’s plan did not 
succeed was due to the fact that it was not executed as planned.116  Schlieffen, who spent years 
developing the concept and building the means to ensure the victory, retired in 1905.  He was 
succeeded by General Helmuth von Moltke who allegedly changed key aspects of the plan based 
on his notions of how the war would unfold (weakened the right wing of the main effort in the 
west).  As a Schlieffen loyalist one must assume that Freytag-Loringhaven’s comments were at 
least partly based on trying to shift blame for the German Army’s failure to someone other than 
Schlieffen. 
According to Freytag-Loringhaven the changes that Moltke implemented ruined the 
essence of the plan and hamstrung its ability to succeed.  Moltke rebalanced the forces at his 
disposal and although the German right wing remained the main effort it did not have sufficient 
forces to execute the mission Schlieffen envisioned for it.  Freytag-Loringhaven states that 
Schlieffen had exhorted those who served with him as well as those who succeeded him to 
ensure that the right wing remained as strong as he had originally envisioned.  
 Based on the comments in the introduction it should appear to us that the larger lesson 
was not learned by the GGS and the notion that a Cannae like victory was possible on the scale 
envisioned by Schlieffen survived the First World War intact and foreshadowed much of what 
was to come in the Second World War.117  Hannibal’s tactical victory at Cannae could be 
reproduced on a strategic scale if only done properly.  Freytag-Loringhaven maintains that the 
failure of the Schlieffen Plan was not in concept but in execution. 
If Schlieffen’s Plan did not bring success on the western front, for whatever reason, 
events in the east against the Russians proved in many respects to be the Cannae that was 
envisioned.  The success was only tactical and did not yield strategic success as envisioned by 
the GGS.  The overall German plan for the war envisioned sufficient time to defeat the allies in 
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the west and then transport forces east in order to deal with the Russians.  As it turned out this 
was not possible as the Russians moved much more quickly than anyone had anticipated and 
advanced into East Prussia. 
Owing to the rapid advance of the Russians into Prussia, the Germans were forced to act 
in a much more decisive manner than they had anticipated.  The Russians had brought up 
approximately 400,000 men opposed by little more than 200,000 on the German side.  
Additionally the Russians enjoyed an advantage in guns versus the Germans and were in a 
difficult situation.118  
Although the situation appeared grim, the German commanders had actually several 
advantages which were to figure mightily in the outcome of any conflict.  As a result of over 25 
years of planning, wargaming, and terrain familiarization, the German officers in the East were 
absolutely knowledgeable of the terrain.  They were also conversant in the probable actions the 
Russians would have to take in any invasion of Prussia.  This knowledge was to prove critical to 
success.119 
Acting in a decisive manner with the forces at his disposal, the newly arrived commander 
of German forces in the East, Paul von Hindenburg, elected to use terrain and bold decision-
making to his advantage in hopes of delivering an unexpected, but crushing blow to the attacking 
Russian forces.  A product of the GGS, General Hindenburg used intuition, the canalizing effects 
of the terrain, and in the greatest traditions of Hannibal took advantage of enemy personalities to 
achieve victory.  The Russians had advanced in two main bodies, widely separated.  The Russian 
commanders were barely on speaking terms and were coordinating their efforts in only the most 
rudimentary fashion.  This error was to prove their undoing.  The army in the North delayed after 
a meeting engagement with the Germans.  The army in the South advanced based on bad 
intelligence and faulty assumptions.120 
Hindenburg acted deliberately and decisively by accepting risk in the North, stripping his 
forces almost bare and concentrating his main effort against the Southern wing of the Russian 
advance.  Hindenburg’s actions provide one of the greatest examples of the influence of 
Hannibal and Cannae successfully executed.  The lessons he had learned under the tutelage of 
Moltke and Schlieffen were in full play.  In the spirit of Cannae, he advanced a thin center 
against the main Russian force.  He ensured that these troops would bend but not break by using 
native Prussians.  These soldiers would put up the kind of resistance called for by the situation.  
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Even if they gave ground they would not quit the field.  This was all the better as they would in 
effect pull the mass of the Russian army into the jaws of a double envelopment by the rest of the 
German army.121  
With time of the essence, Hindenburg displayed a remarkable sense of timing.  The 
overarching goal in his mind was the destruction of the Russians in a short period of time.  
Everything hinged on his ability to destroy the Russians rapidly.  His allies, the Austrians were 
also fighting for their lives against the Russians in Poland and Austro-Hungary and he needed to 
be able to move to their aid if necessary.   
His victory could not have been more complete.  In what has come to be known as the 
“Cannae of the East,” Hindenburg achieved his battle of annihilation.  He encircled and 
destroyed three Russian Corps.  The Russians lost over 125,000 men including making prisoners 
of some 90,000 troops.  The Germans captured over 500 field artillery pieces as well.  The scope 
of the victory was staggering, although the results did not change the eventual outcome of the 
war.  The Russian commander of the Southern forces (Alexander Samsonov) committed suicide.  
The victory freed hundreds of thousands of German troops for use elsewhere, and gave the 
victory of Tannenberg the same significance as that of Cannae.122  The lesson for the Great 
General Staff was that these type victories were still possible if pursued and executed properly.  
In hindsight it is clear that the Germans were greatly aided by Russian bumbling as much as 
tactical brilliance on the part of Hindenburg and his staff.123  Similar to Cannae, the Russians 
provided the “Terentius Varro” to help make this victory possible for the Germans. 
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CHAPTER 7 - 20th Century to the Present 
Throughout the 20th century there has been a steady stream of books and articles relevant 
to study of the Second Punic War and more specifically Hannibal’s influence on the art of war.  
In spite of its age this period and its actors continue to influence military thinkers as well as those 
still fascinated by a good story.   
The nature of the influence during this timeframe generally falls into three categories.  
The first category deals almost exclusively on the tactical aspects of Hannibal’s battles and more 
specifically on the battle of Cannae.  The second category consists of those writings that focus 
generally on the historical record, and the final category deals with those writings that focus on 
Hannibal’s influence on strategic thinking.   
Tactical Aspects 
Even today, the influence of the disaster of Cannae is still relevant to almost any 
discussion of warfighting.  It continues to be written about, discussed and dissected some two 
thousand years after its occurrence.  It is even discussed in the realm of “What If?” pertaining to 
the American Civil War.  In a collection of essays by the same name, one of the articles 
speculates as to how General Lee might have wrought a Cannae early in the war in 1862, and 
used it as a springboard for a Confederate victory in the war.  The idea is pure conjecture but 
illustrates the use of Cannae as the benchmark of success in battle that should have been 
leveraged into success in the broader war.124  It is difficult to escape the lingering influence of 
that singular event.   
If the Great General Staff of the German Army became the biggest proponent of the 
battle of annihilation in thought and doctrine, there has also been a steady stream of others who 
have continued to study and emulate the outcome of Hannibal’s greatest victory.  The First 
World War provided a great foundation and springboard for many desiring to implement the 
tactical aspects of Cannae.  Although that war did not turn out as the Germans intended, the 
foundation of trying to achieve battles of annihilation did not die out upon conclusion of that 
conflict.  There was an entire generation of German senior commanders steeped in the teachings 
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of Schlieffen and others who were imbued with the notions and necessity of achieving Cannae-
like battles.   
These attitudes carried over into the Second World War and numerous commanders in 
the German Army displayed the characteristics and were often quite vocal in their attitudes 
towards achieving a “modern” Cannae.  Perhaps chief among these was General Erwin Rommel 
during his conduct of campaigns in North Africa.  
 There was hardly an area or force more conducive to the conduct of mobile warfare than 
that of Rommel’s Afrika Corps and the North African Theater of Operations.  Rommel’s army 
was highly mobile, and the terrain lent itself to the practice of maneuver warfare on a large scale.  
His practice of the art and the tools at his disposal were very analogous to those of Hannibal.  
Rommel’s main striking force was a highly mobile and powerful armored force used in the same 
manner as Hannibal’s cavalry.  Rommel’s writings indicate that he was influenced by the tactics 
of Hannibal.  During his campaign to recapture Cyrenaica in North Africa, Rommel wrote to his 
wife: “It’s going to be a Cannae, modern style.”125   
Another example of Hannibal’s persistent influence is found in the writings of Dwight 
Eisenhower.  His biographer describes how one of the singular events in the life of Eisenhower 
occurred when a childhood friend gave him a copy of a book entitled Hannibal and the Second 
Punic War.  Not only was Eisenhower an avid reader and student of military history, but he 
states in his own words that that childhood gift was what put him on a course to enter the 
military and become a student of the art of war.  He writes that many years later, as the 
commander of all allied forces in Europe, he was obsessed with the idea of achieving a Cannae 
against the German Army, “Every ground commander seeks the battle of annihilation; so far as 
conditions permit, he tries to duplicate in modern war the classic example of Cannae.”126   
Eisenhower’s interest in Hannibal was kindled at an early age and he credits his study of 
ancient history with greatly influencing his thinking on the art of war.  Perhaps his own 
circumstances during the Second World War caused him to identify himself with the “underdog” 
Hannibal.  He described it, “Hannibal always seemed to be the underdog, neglected by his 
government and fighting during the most of his active years in the territory of his deadly and 
powerful enemy.”127  Eisenhower’s comments coupled with the level of his command, suggests 
that much like the GGS from the First World War, he too was trying to recreate a Cannae at the 
strategic level.  Carlo D’Este writes in context of the final allied invasion of Germany, “Once 
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across the Rhine, the armies of Hodges and Simpson would encircle the Ruhr and crush Model’s 
Army Group B in the jaws of a huge Allied pincer: Eisenhower’s Cannae.”128     
A more recent example comes from the Persian Gulf War in 1991.  As commander of the 
coalition armies, General Schwarzkopf was charged with ejecting the Iraqi army from the nation 
of Kuwait where it had spent the better part of six months pillaging and digging in after invading 
its oil-rich neighbor.  Ignoring numerous pleas to pull his forces out of Kuwait, Saddam 
Hussein’s army was forcibly removed and Kuwait restored to the Kuwaitis. 
In developing the operations plan to put all forces at his disposal to use, Schwarzkopf 
chose as his model, Hannibal’s battle of Cannae.  He remarked to a newspaper reporter that his 
intent was to fix the Iraqis in place in the center of the line, and then conduct an envelopment in 
order to cut off and destroy the Iraqi forces that were still in place after a six-week air 
campaign.129  Using deception to mask the movement of the bulk of his highly mobile armored 
forces, Schwarzkopf conducted a flanking movement to the west, facilitated by a shore-based 
Marine Corps fixing attack in the center of the line.  Following the Cannae example, another 
threatened but never executed flanking attack from the east was accomplished with operationally 
mobile ship-based Marine and Naval forces in the Persian Gulf. 
In many respects the campaign orchestrated by Schwarzkopf resembled Hannibal’s 
victory at Cannae as well as the lack of long-term resolution to a festering problem.  The 
coalition won a spectacular victory over a well-armed force destroying a large portion of the 
Iraqi Army and much of its most prized equipment.  The Iraqis were also expelled from Kuwait.  
However in the larger picture - much as Cannae failed to produce an ultimate victory in the war 
for Hannibal, Schwarzkopf’s victory failed to produce any long-lasting consequences in the 
region and the United States and a small coalition went to war again over a decade later to 
achieve results which might have been secured during the Persian Gulf Campaign.  
Historical Aspects 
The second common example of how Hannibal and his actions continue to influence 
events is in the study of history.  No new evidence has been uncovered in many years, and one 
would assume that all that can be written and said about the Second Punic War has already been 
done.  However, this is not the case and several examples lead to the conclusion that the topic 
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remains a fascinating one and successive generations of historians continue to seek to glean new 
insights and conclusions from studying the available material. 
In what is one of the most detailed and informative studies, Archer Jones traces the 
evolution of the art of war in the West.  Numerous pages are devoted to an examination of the 
competition between the Roman system as it had evolved during the time of the Punic Wars and 
that of the Carthaginians.  The Carthaginian system was descended from Macedon and the 
Greeks, although modified in many ways by Hannibal and his generals. 
In Jones’ book the clash of the two systems is set in historical context both before and 
after the Punic Wars.  We see that the competing systems were highly dependent upon the 
competence of those directing the armies, providing an example of professional generalship 
besting well-trained troops with adequate leadership.  Using an example of generalship similar to 
Hannibal’s, Jones details Pyrrhus of Epirus’ ability to defeat the Romans through skillful 
command vice superior troops.130   
Historian Hans Delbruck traces the Carthaginian style of warfare back to that of Pyrrhus 
and Alexander.131  Hannibal and his father improved upon the system until it was virtually 
unbeatable when directed by Hannibal.  Although the Romans remain formidable and capable of 
inflicting great casualties, the tools (high quality cavalry in large numbers, and a keen 
understanding of his opponents among other things) at the disposal of Hannibal and the way he 
employed them were superior in just about every context. 
What is relevant to this paper is the evolution of the practice of warfare by the Romans as 
modified by their experiences against Hannibal.  Jones highlights that the Romans eventually got 
generals who were the equal of Hannibal but in doing so they greatly changed how they 
appointed and maintained their generals.  More importantly though, they displayed the flexibility 
and propensity to adapt and incorporate the best aspects of their opponents’ systems into their 
own.  These modifications coupled with the excellent building blocks of the Roman military 
proved highly lethal to Rome’s enemies.  In the final battle of the Second Punic War, Hannibal is 
decisively defeated by Roman arms but one of the key instruments of his defeat is the same 
cavalry, now employed by the Romans, which had brought Hannibal victory in so many 
battles.132  This example being just one of many to illustrate the thesis of Jones’ book – to show 
the evolution of Western arms, based in large part on flexibility and willingness to adapt new 
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concepts.  In this context Hannibal and his campaigns are viewed as having a significant shaping 
effect and helped mold the flexibility characteristic of Western success in arms. 
In the same vein, Colonel Trevor Dupuy writes that Hannibal’s contribution to the art of 
war was his ability to improvise and come up with new ideas.  Dupuy states that Hannibal’s main 
contribution to thinking on the art of war is in the area of “imagination.”  He did not have 
superior trained or better-equipped forces.  But what he did have was a focus on maneuver and 
an unparalleled creativity that allowed him to continually best his opponents.133  This provides a 
clear link to the evolution of military thinking away from rigid prescription to “mission” type 
orders and the desire for commanders and leaders to adapt quickly to changing situations to 
achieve victory.  
Strategic Insights 
The final area that continues to provide additional areas for research and comparison is 
that of national strategy.  This is not purely confined to military thinking and for obvious reasons 
the Second Punic War provides fertile ground for discussion on how a nation ought to go to war, 
and how it should tend to its affairs once it has made the decision to do so.    
In his signal work The Influence of Seapower Upon History, Alfred T. Mahan cites the 
Second Punic War as a particularly relevant example of how sea power (or the lack) is 
instrumental in the conduct of war.  According to Mahan, the leverage afforded the Romans by 
virtue of holding supremacy at sea was decisive.  Hannibal’s efforts in the war were severely 
hamstrung by his lack of reliable “communications” with any resource base.134  This fact seems 
to tie in with the general lack of assistance from the Carthaginian government.  Hannibal’s 
problems were compounded in light of the fact that Carthage made no attempt to wrest control of 
the seas from the Romans after the First Punic War.  It is possible to debate the level of 
involvement in the war effort of the Carthaginian government but supporting Hannibal by sea 
was never really a feasible course of action. 
In an even more insightful example, Mahan states that the alliance between Macedonia 
and Carthage produced nothing due to the lack of a war fleet on the part of the Macedonians.  
The lesson learned for the strategist is that the lack of communications across the sea kept 
Carthage and Macedonia from consummating their alliance in any meaningful way and ensured 
that Hannibal remained short of resources throughout the war.135  According to Livy, even the 
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initial deputation sent from Philip of Macedon to Hannibal was unable to successfully complete 
its mission owing to Roman command of the seas.136 
In another study, Men in Arms, A History of Warfare and its Interrelationships with 
Western Society, the resiliency of the Roman form of government is extolled.  In this 
examination by Richard Preston and Sydney Wise, the relationship between Rome and the 
subject people of Italy is examined in light of events of the Second Punic War.  In this context it 
is interesting to note that despite the significant victories Hannibal obtained against Rome and 
her allies, he was never able to obtain truly significant aid from most of the Roman allies.  
Preston and Wise develop a thesis similar to Machiavelli’s that the Roman system of governance 
and raising citizen armies was inherently superior to that of Carthage.  The Romans treated 
military service as a right and obligation for all, not just a select few.    
The reason for this becomes clear when one examines how the two antagonists treated 
their subjects.  In spite of Hannibal’s declaration that he was coming to free the Latin cities from 
the yoke and oppression of Rome, no significant city save Capua took him up on the offer.137  
Even during the darkest days of the Republic in 216 B.C.E., immediately after Cannae the bulk 
of the Latins remained loyal and refused to treat with Hannibal.  According to Preston and Wise 
this should be directly attributed to the style of governance of Rome as contrasted with the lack 
of appeal of the governance of Carthage.     
The people of the various constituencies were allowed a great deal of autonomy, were 
given the right of citizenship, and apparently felt a great deal of loyalty towards the Roman 
confederation.  One of Hannibal’s apparent assumptions and a pillar of his strategy appear to 
have rested on the idea that the Latins would abandon Rome in large numbers if given the 
opportunity.  That it never happened is at least partial testament to the Roman form of 
government and the loyalty it inspired.138  This book also provides clear insights into the 
perceived merits of one system over the other and the value of placing a premium on citizenship 
and loyalty in the populace.  The prospect of falling under the sway of Carthage was not enough 
to entice significant numbers of converts to Hannibal’s side.  Hannibal’s apparent strategy 
provides an example of how the culture and institutions of both sides should be considered by the 
strategist (and not just the military strategist). 
In another supporting argument along the lines of culture, institutions, and ideology, 
Victor Davis Hanson argues that the political system of Rome ensured that Carthage would never 
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win the confrontation.   He believes that although Carthage with its long history in the 
Mediterranean and its affiliation with the Greek city states had achieved a veneer of Western-
looking culture, it was still quite hobbled by its closer resemblance to Eastern cultures and 
oppressive forms of government.  He seems to be correct based on the response of “liberated” 
areas of Italy to Hannibal.  According to Hanson, Carthage did not extend the privileges of 
citizenship to many of its subjects.  This policy did not hold much promise for the Latins. 
In practical terms it meant that despite substandard leadership of its armies at times, 
directly resulting in horrendous losses in battle, the Romans were always able to replace those 
losses.  The reason for this is that the Roman system tended to inspire loyalty and an outright 
desire to serve.  Despite having populations that were approximately the same size in numbers, 
Carthage was never able to muster equivalent numbers of troops for its armies.  Hanson points 
out that even with the huge losses the Romans suffered during the first two years of the war, they 
were still able to not only replace those losses but increase the size of its army in a relatively 
short period of time.  The Carthaginian army was never larger than it was when it debouched 
from the Alps into northern Italy.  Hanson writes,  
This idea of a vast nation-in-arms – by the outbreak of the war in 218 B.C.E. there 
were more than 325,000 adult male Roman citizens scattered throughout Italy, 
nearly a quarter million of them eligible for frontline military service - was 
incomprehensible to the Carthaginians, who restricted citizenship to a small group 
of Punic-speakers in and around Carthage.  Worse still in a military sense, 
citizenship to Carthaginians never fully embraced the Hellenic tradition of civic 
levies- citizens who enjoy rights are required to fight for their maintenance.139 
Hanson’s study of Carthage and Hannibal provides additional evidence of their continued impact 
on the study of war.  In consonance with the observations of Preston and Wise, Hanson’s 
comments provide additional support to the notion that politicians and strategists must consider 
aspects of culture and institutions that were previously ignored or given very little attention. 
A key lesson learned in terms of this thesis is the apparent failure of Hannibal and his 
Carthaginian masters to fully comprehend the larger strategic landscape.  As much a genius as 
Hannibal was in many aspects of warfighting, he seems to remain blind to the larger picture.  
During the first two years of his campaign against Rome and his series of incredible victories 
that killed hundreds of thousands of troops, he still underestimated the effect those losses would 
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have on the outcome of the war.  Although impossible to know for certain, it does not appear that 
Hannibal fully considered whether his offer of life under Carthaginian rule would provide a real 
incentive for the peoples of the Italian Peninsula.     
In spite of slaughtering 50,000 Romans at Cannae, Hanson states that the outcome of the 
war was not changed one iota.140  According to this interpretation of Hannibal’s legacy, the real 
lesson to be learned is not that of the blueprint for the classic battle of envelopment and 
annihilation.  The real lessons are those of the superiority of the political and cultural institutions 
of the West over all others.  These institutions underpin the militaries of the West and directly 
contribute towards making them the most efficient and resilient killers in history.  While one 
cannot predict the future, it seems that Hanson is correct – Western armies have raised the 
standard of professionalism and combined arms fighting to a level that no others can currently 
match.       
Though they are quite capable of suffering setbacks, and do so on a regular basis, the 
societal and cultural undergirding of Western armies ensures that they have been able to adapt, 
and learn from their failures in a manner no other system has been able to equal.  During this 
period of increasing threat to the West’s institutions and military from Middle Eastern and Asian 
cultures, Hanson seems to be using Hannibal to demonstrate that regardless of the challenges – 
the West will triumph owing to its fundamental institutions.  
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CHAPTER 8 - Summary 
This paper has demonstrated in a chronological manner the long-term influence of 
Hannibal of Carthage on the art of war.  Despite the passing of over two thousand years since he 
lived, Hannibal continues to fascinate and inspire those interested in the military arts.  From 
ancient history through the 20th Century he has been an object of study, criticism, and emulation.  
In the early 21st Century he remains a frequent topic of discussion and continued scrutiny. 
For those who study Hannibal, lessons learned from his campaigns fall into two broad 
categories.  The first category is that of the strategist.  For them Hannibal’s actions in the Second 
Punic War are fraught with missteps interspersed with moments of genius.  The conception of 
the war, to be fought offensively on land in Italy rather than defensively at sea or on the soil of 
Carthage was a well-conceived idea and characterized as genius.   
Moving the base of operations from Carthage to the Iberian Peninsula, and using Spain 
rather than North Africa as the springboard for a war with Rome illustrates a well-planned and 
far-reaching concept of operations.  Marching overland from Spain with a large army and 
appearing on the doorstep of Rome is considered a masterstroke.  For a variety of reasons, 
Hannibal has rightly earned the title “father of strategy.”141   
But if the title “father of strategy” is correct, one should be able to question just how 
good a father?  As outlined in this thesis, there are many authors that view Hannibal in light of 
his strategic failures.  For all the elements of brilliance in conception and execution of 
Hannibal’s plan for the war, the fact remains that he lost.  After a huge war almost equivalent to 
World War II in modern times, Carthage was led to ruin.  On one scale he was successful enough 
to ensure that the Romans feared him and Carthage for all time.  However, in spite of his 
numerous successes on a variety of levels, Hannibal was not able to achieve ultimate victory 
against the Romans. 
Viewed in this light, the example provided to us by Hannibal is not a favorable one.  He 
becomes yet another Lee or Rommel – great men, endowed with tremendous talents and gifts of 
intuition, decisiveness, and constitution.  Yet, he is still one of those who failed to achieve the 
ultimate end-state against his opponents.  Much as the United States won every battle of 
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consequence during the Vietnam War, yet failed to achieve strategic victory, Hannibal’s 
campaigns against the Romans created the blueprint for success in battle without ultimate victory 
in war. 
The principle lesson for the strategist is to ensure that all the actions in war are tied to the 
ultimate goal, which is to win the war.  Writers continue to emphasize that developing and 
executing a winning strategy is hard.  As Colin Gray points out in the Joint Force Quarterly, 
winning the battles is the relatively easy part, producing a cohesive strategy and harnessing 
disparate elements of national power to produce a well-defined end result is difficult.  His article 
cites examples ranging from Hannibal and the Second Punic War, to the Germans in World War 
II, and the United States in Indochina.142   
It is difficult in war to weave together all the required elements to ensure triumph. 
Victory often requires a level of control of resources that is frequently beyond the grasp of the 
military leader.  In the case of Hannibal, it appears that he had great autonomy to pursue the war 
as he saw fit.  It does not appear that he and the Carthaginian government’s efforts were 
completely synchronized.  It also seems that many of Hannibal’s assumptions were incorrect as 
to the probable course of the war.  The entire episode of the Second Punic War provides an 
object lesson for current military and civilian planners alike as to ensuring the validity of 
assumptions and the synchronization of efforts.    
Regardless of the speculation into what might have been, in the strategic arena, Hannibal 
falls short.  Those who view Hannibal’s achievements through the lens of a strategist rightly 
point out his overall failure in the war as the paramount lesson.  For all the flashes of brilliance 
as a strategist, that aspect of warfare was not his greatest strength. 
In the realm of the tactical, Hannibal enjoys much greater acclaim when viewed 
critically.  As the author of the original “blueprint” for the battle of encirclement and 
annihilation, his actions are still studied, copied, and held up as the benchmark for success.  
Many historians and students of the military arts regard Cannae as the exemplar of this type of 
battle.   
Hannibal’s conception and execution of operations at the tactical level are the true 
success stories of his career.  No author has impugned Hannibal’s conduct of battles.  In this 
regard he is without peer, taking the battles in isolation from the larger strategic picture.  
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Hannibal’s ability to forge an army from so many different materials and wield it successfully 
for so long against many different opponents is a remarkable achievement by any standard. 
Additionally, one cannot ignore the other factors that set Hannibal apart from his peers 
and successors over time.  His ability to focus and synchronize the efforts of such a polyglot 
force proved outstanding.  Few leaders have managed to build a cohesive fighting force out of so 
many disparate elements.  Considering the difficulty modern generals encounter synchronizing 
coalitions of troops from nations with varying capabilities, Hannibal’s achievements are 
exemplary.   
It is difficult to imagine a more diverse group of peoples being led to a record of 
achievement to eclipse that of Hannibal’s armies.  The key components of his leadership ability - 
personal example, genius, and the ability to inspire are manifested throughout the conduct of his 
battles.143  These qualities allowed Hannibal to overcome (for awhile) a great disparity in 
resources, considering that he faced in Rome the equivalent of a budding superpower.   
Although some have attributed that label to Carthage as well, the comparison is not exact.  
Carthage was a powerful maritime nation and an economic superpower.  Rome manifested the 
capabilities of a superpower across a variety of categories, including the military.   This contrast 
provides more reason to value the tactical and strategic achievements of Hannibal. 
In the final accounting, it is difficult to measure exactly how much Hannibal has 
influenced the study of war.  It is safe to say that he has been a benchmark of one sort or another 
in discussions on the art of war.  From ancient history to the present, his name occurs regularly in 
books, periodicals, and in the programs of instruction in military service schools.   
The direction of Hannibal’s influence over time is even more difficult to determine.  It 
appears to depend on what aspect of war is considered.  If the discussion is on matters of 
strategy, national policy, or other high-level concerns, then Hannibal’s influence is on the 
negative side.  The failure to win the ultimate victory for whatever reason militates in favor of 
Hannibal’s influence being negative.  It is hard after all, to extol the virtues of the loser when so 
much was lost. 
If the discussion remains at the tactical level, then Hannibal provides an excellent model.  
He sets the standard in any comparison based on a general’s ability to win battles, to create 
conditions unfavorable for the enemy, to out-think his opponents, and perhaps most importantly, 
to get the very best from his men.  The examples of creative thinking, inspired by genius, are 
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manifest everywhere in his operations.  As long as the discussion remains at levels of war other 
than strategic, then Hannibal is an exemplar of the soldier practicing his craft. 
There is one certainty regarding Hannibal; he will continue to be a source of study and 
learning in one respect or another.  Whether the lesson is for good or ill, contemplating Hannibal, 
his campaigns, and his battles will remain a worthwhile investment for any student or 
practitioner of the military arts. 
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